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ABSTRACT 
In the past five years, the United States has seen a noticeable increase in racially, 
ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) activity. By examining the relevance of 
defining terrorism as international or domestic, this thesis identifies antiquated 
assumptions that have hindered the U.S. federal approach to investigating and 
prosecuting REMVE organizations. It also explores whether U.S. legal and judicial 
frameworks are adaptive enough to address emerging REMVE trends and how the 
homeland security enterprise can better mitigate and respond to the threat. Using case 
study analysis to explore the Atomwaffen Division and the Base—two accelerationist, 
white, ethno-nationalist groups with transnational ties—the thesis documents the 
emerging trend of REMVE actors, their ideology and motivation, and the digital and 
transnational context of their activity. The thesis also delves into the ways the First and 
Fourth Amendments shape the investigation and prosecution of violent extremists, and 
how their application to domestic and international terrorism varies, as defined in 18 
U.S.C. §2331. Homegrown violent extremist organizations can no longer be 
automatically classified as domestic terrorists. In cases where transnational links exist, 
the homeland security enterprise should leverage the same tools that have been applied to 
international terrorist threats such as al-Qaida.
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In the last five years, the United States has seen a noticeable increase in racially, 
ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) activity. A report completed by the 
University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism confirmed a steady increase in attacks motivated by far-right extremism in the 
United States, from fewer than 10 in 2007 to 35 attacks in 2017; conversely, world-wide 
terror attacks between 2014 and 2018 have dropped 43 percent.1 The argument that U.S. 
domestic violent extremists of the REMVE persuasion are a more deadly threat in the 
United States is supported by a more recent dataset collected by Peter Bergen and 
colleagues for New America.2 The 2018–2020 analysis by Peter Bergen et al. illustrates 
that for every death caused by international terrorists, 11 deaths were caused by U.S. 
domestic violent extremists.3 While the University of Maryland’s and Bergen’s datasets 
do not cover the same timeframe, they do validate the observation of increasing right-wing 
terrorism over time. 
Due to this increase and emerging trends in REMVE activity, this thesis examined 
the relevance of categorizing terrorists as either international or domestic and whether these 
categorical assumptions impeded or assisted in the investigation and/or prosecution of 
either type. This thesis proceeded to investigate the malleability of the U.S. legal and 
judicial frameworks to address the emerging REMVE trends by delving into the ways the 
First and Fourth Amendments shape the investigation and prosecution of violent 
extremists, and how the legal process varies in the application to international and domestic 
terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331. To demonstrate the application of the research, 
two case studies were completed on the Atomwaffen Division (AWD) and the Base.  
 
1 Jessica Rivinius, “Global Terrorism Decreases in 2018 as Recent Uptick in U.S. Terrorist Attacks 
Was Sustained,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Reponses to Terrorism, October 8, 
2019, https://www.start.umd.edu/news/global-terrorism-decreases-2018-recent-uptick-us-terrorist-attacks-
was-sustained. 
2 Peter Bergen et al., “Part IV. What Is the Threat to the United States Today?,” New America, 
accessed February 2, 2021, http://newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-
today/. 
3 Bergen et al. 
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This thesis documents the foundational and validating ideologies of 
accelerationism and ethnonationalism to explain the REMVE movement. Furthermore, it 
explores how the REMVE movement has used the digital media ecosystem to establish 
transnational or international connections among like-minded individuals and 
organizations and expand their recruitment, training, and radicalization. As Bergen et al. 
describe, “The increasing role of social media and the internet . . . in crafting messages to 
radicalize and recruit individuals” is consistent across the spectrum of extremism.4 Indeed, 
Bergen et al. have calculated that 52 percent of extremists radicalized online.5  
Homegrown REMVE actors and organizations are using transnational partnerships 
to transform homegrown REMVE organizations into international organizations. Many of 
these organizations act domestically, but with their international influence and connections, 
they can no longer be defined solely as a domestic entity. Furthermore, this new distinction 
opens options for the United States to leverage the foreign country designation and 
sanctions as legal grounds for designating REMVE actors or organizations with 
transnational ties. As such, relevant ideology and overseas connections contradict the label 
placed on homegrown REMVE actors or organizations as purely domestic; therefore, they 
should be recognized as a collective entity and, thus, an international terrorist organization. 
The homeland security enterprise (HSE) needs to shift the way it perceives and 
approaches terrorism and national security to better respond to this rising threat. This thesis 
ultimately argues that homegrown violent extremist organizations can no longer be 
automatically classified as domestic terrorists. In cases where transnational links exist, the 
HSE should leverage the same tools that have been applied to international terrorist threats 
such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State. 
 
4 Peter Bergen et al., “Part III. Why Do They Engage in Terrorism?,” New America, accessed 
February 2, 2021, http://newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/why-do-they-commit-terrorist-acts/. 
5 Bergen et al. 
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The shared ideological theories explored in this thesis include accelerationism and 
ethnonationalism.6 Accelerationism, based on classical Marxist concepts, describes how 
such forces as unrestrained capitalism intensify to a point of self-destruction and ultimately 
cause a systematic collapse.7 REMVE actors or organizations accept the concept of 
acceleration, but instead of focusing on capitalism, they have adapted the narrative to 
accelerate polarization to induce a race war that will cause the collapse of society as it is 
known and rebuild it as a white ethno-state.8 Ethnonationalism, on the other hand, aligns 
with the cultural, ethnic and racial ultra-nationalism, all of which hold that races should 
not intermingle and that migrants must assimilate to the host country’s societal norms.9 
Accelerationism and ethnonationalism have been a focal point in both the U.S. REMVE 
movement and the European identarian movement. French identitarian Guillaume Faye, in 
his book Why We Fight, and Renaud Camus, in his book The Great Replacement, have 
warned of the impending demise of European identity if mass migration and cultural 
genocide are not stopped.10  
Related to patterns of behavior in U.S. homegrown and European REMVE 
ideology, social identity theory (SIT) is a grounding theory that helps explain the social 
interactions among in-groups and out-groups. SIT frames discourse or events through 
internalized ethnic, cultural, religious, or political frameworks, providing individuals with 
an ability to contextualize, compartmentalize, and interpret information.11 SIT helps to 
 
6 Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner, The “Great Replacement”: The Violent Consequences of 
Mainstreamed Extremism (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, July 2019), https://www.isdglobal.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/07/The-Great-Replacement-The-Violent-Consequences-of-Mainstreamed-
Extremism-by-ISD.pdf. 
7 Stephen Yang, “A Marxist Lens on the Digital Age—Part 1,” Cornell Daily Sun, March 2, 2020, 
https://cornellsun.com/2020/03/02/yang-a-marxist-lens-on-the-digital-age-part-1/. 
8 Davey and Ebner, Great Replacement, 13. 
9 Niki Sterkenburg, A Practical Introduction to Far-Right Extremism (Amsterdam: Radicalisation 
Awareness Network Centre of Excellence, 2019), 7, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/
files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ran_fre_factbook_
20191205_en.pdf. 
10 Guillaume Faye, Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Resistance (London: Arktos Media, 
2011); Davey and Ebner, Great Replacement. 
11 David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, A Practitioners Way Forward: Terrorism 
Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 10. 
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explain the patterns of both European groups and homegrown U.S. REMVEs, particularly 
the reasons for their connecting and cross-pollinating and the means by which they find 
each other. REMVE actors are using digital platforms to meet, socialize, and validate their 
beliefs online. These digital platforms amalgamate in the digital media ecosystem (DME), 
which comprises, but is not limited to, mainstream social media applications, such as 
Facebook and its alternative Parler, and Twitter and its alternative Gab; imageboards such 
as 8chan, 4chan, and 8chun; voice and chat platforms, such as Discord; cloud-based 
encrypted instant messaging over internet-protocol services, such as Telegram and 
Threema; video-sharing sites, such as YouTube; information aggregators, such as Reddit; 
and mainstream mass media, such as CNN and Fox News. 
The use of the DME to communicate with like-minded individuals, radicalize an 
otherwise unreachable cohort, and connect with both U.S.- and foreign-based domestic 
terrorists is one of the aspects that makes this new generation of REMVE actors or 
organizations such an exponentially difficult threat to quantify. This movement is 
geographically nationless and does not seek a permanent home but thrives in the dialogue 
of extremist ideology posted on imageboards, chans, and blogs. 
To illustrate the emerging trends in REMVE, this thesis provides case studies of 
the AWD and the Base to describe those aspects. Just as the medium in which extremists 
communicate has changed, so, too, has their social commingling as they have transitioned, 
in some cases, from the shadows of the internet to in-person meetings and survivalism 
training camps. The AWD and the Base have begun to establish meaningful connections 
overseas and affiliated organizations in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Norway, 
and Australia. Some members have even traveled to Europe to comingle with like-minded 
individuals.12 Terrorism expert Tim Lister explains that some REMVE actors have used 
the civil war in Ukraine as mercenaries used the war in Syria—to develop skills and receive 
training that could be useful in other conflicts or in their homelands.13 
 
12 Jason Blazakis et al., The Atomwaffen Division: The Evolution of the White Supremacy Threat 
(New York: Soufan Center, 2020), https://thesoufancenter.org/research/the-atomwaffen-division-the-
evolution-of-the-white-supremacy-threat/. 
13 Tim Lister, “The Nexus between Far-Right Extremists in the United States and Ukraine,” CTC 
Sentinel 13, no. 4 (April 2020): 30–41. 
xv 
Homegrown REMVE actors are using the legal blanket of the First Amendment to 
spread vitriol and then shield themselves from owning the violence they incite. If U.S. 
authorities transition from viewing violent extremists as a First Amendment issue to 
concentrating on the deeds committed because of their words, then the Fourth Amendment 
comes into focus. Investigating U.S. citizens is complicated, but the post-9/11 global war 
on terrorism has set a strong precedent that even First Amendment protections can be 
overcome when clearly defined threats to national security exist.  
This thesis argues—in an effort to more effectively counter domestic U.S. REMVE 
organizations—that the HSE will need to acknowledge and leverage the transnational 
elements and reach of homegrown U.S. REMVE organizations or actors. When 
transnational links can be established, authorities should no longer treat these threats as 
domestic, as they are no longer purely on U.S. soil, but instead investigate and prosecute 
them as the international actors and organizations they are. By the end, this thesis will show 
that the precedent has been established for allowing national security concerns to supersede 
concerns about constitutional protections, and it should be applied equally in cases of white 
nationalist extremists with international connections.  
  
xvi 




Recent events are driving authorities and citizens to analyze the phenomena of 
racially, ethnically motivated violent extremists (REMVEs), which encompass 
identitarians, white nationalists, the alt-right, and anti-authoritarians, and the use of 
violence to incite civil unrest.1 Domestically, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
issued a National Terrorism Advisory Bulletin on January 27, 2021, stating that 
“throughout 2020, Domestic Violent Extremists . . . targeted individuals with opposing 
views engaged in First Amendment-protected, non-violent protest activity . . . [and] plotted 
and on occasion carried out attacks against government facilities,” angered by “long-
standing racial and ethnic tension.”2 The bulletin elaborates: “DHS remains concerned that 
Homegrown Violent Extremists . . . inspired by foreign terrorist groups . . . remain a 
threat.”3  
Just a year earlier, on January 16, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
arrested three members of the Maryland cell of the Base, a transnational REMVE 
organization. The three members were not indicted on charges directly related to terrorism 
but on multiple firearms offenses based on credible intelligence they were an imminent 
threat to a gun rights rally held in Richmond, Virginia, the following week.4 Why were 
those three not charged on terrorism grounds? If they had been handled as domestic 
terrorists, there would have been no applicable federal domestic terrorism laws and, 
 
1 In 2019, acting secretary of DHS Kevin McAleenan coined the term racially, ethnically motivated 
violent extremists, or REMVE, to “respond to the emerging threat landscape. . . . Domestic terrorism/
targeted violence threats [had] become more frequent, more prevalent, more impactful on the American 
conscience.” It is worth noting this charged term—while allowing the author to use one label for 
homegrown violent extremists, white nationalists, ethnonationalists, identitarians, the alt-right, and anti-
authoritarian organizations—loses some granularity. Nevertheless, its use synthesizes the overarching traits 
of the aforementioned violent extremism as hate directed at segments of society because of their race and 
ethnicity. Moreover, in this thesis, REMVE refers to right-wing or far-right terrorism, not left-wing 
terrorism or related groups.  
2 “National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin,” Department of Homeland Security, January 27, 
2021, https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-system-bulletin-january-27-2021. 
3 Department of Homeland Security. 
4 Sarah McCammon, “Virginia Governor Declares State of Emergency Ahead of Gun Rights Rally,” 
NPR, January 15, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/15/796666321/virginia-governor-declares-state-of-
emergency-ahead-of-pro-gun-rally. 
2 
therefore, no grounds to charge them. Even if the argument was that their U.S. citizenship 
granted them constitutional protections to assemble, one member of the Maryland cell was 
a Canadian citizen and not afforded the same protections. This international connection is 
one example of the transnational element evolving in the REMVE movement.  
The homeland security enterprise (HSE) needs to shift the way it perceives and 
approaches terrorism and national security to better respond to this rising threat. The HSE 
is operating on antiquated assumptions that shape the federal application of legal and 
judicial frameworks to homegrown REMVE activity. Three major considerations support 
the urgency of U.S. authorities’ examining the relevance of defining terrorism as 
international or domestic. First, domestic violent extremists are increasingly 
transnationally linked. Second, domestic REMVE organizations are following the same 
machinations or formulas as international Islamic extremists and, thus, should be 
categorized similarly. Third, the United States must realize the significance of its 
international partners and allies by recognizing and designating U.S. organizations as 
terrorist threats.  
The first area to consider is the problematic persistence of a rigid dichotomy in 
classifying terrorism as either international or domestic. This framework was applicable at 
one time, but globalization and the subsequent interconnectedness of the world has 
removed previously clear distinctions. Identity and affinity are less tied to location; 
individuals with certain ideas can connect to like-minded individuals anywhere in the 
world with the click of a button. Terrorism scholars such as Bruce Hoffman and Colin 
Clarke discuss the challenges of counterterrorism strategies that “fail to keep pace with 
either the social media technology that facilitates and abets radicalization or terrorist 
adversaries that defy traditional conceptualizations.”5 Violent extremists plan and discuss 
their actions on the internet, often on semi-secure or even open platforms, which are not 
tied to any single country or location. In order to have effective laws and mitigation 
strategies, the approach to categorizing terrorism needs to be similar to the threat—it needs 
 
5 Bruce Hoffman and Colin Clarke, “The Next American Terrorist,” Cipher Brief, July 2, 2020, 
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-next-american-terrorist. 
3 
to adapt. Approaches need to respond and react to the real nature of the emerging threat 
landscape. 
In multiple aspects, the REMVE movement is showing striking similarities to 
Islamic extremist organizations in terms of how it prepares, organizes, and internationally 
connects with like-minded actors or organizations. Analogous to the training camps the 
Islamic State (IS) set up to assimilate its members and train them in military warfare tactics, 
recent reports have surfaced that the Base’s founder, Rinaldo Nazzaro, is attempting to 
coordinate and fund paramilitary survivalism training not for “an immediate impact, but to 
be felt across decades.”6 In addition, some REMVE organizations are creating 
transnational domestic violent extremist cells in geographically disparate locations 
comparable to international Islamic extremists. Two specific organizations focused on the 
domestic United States but transnational in nature are the Atomwaffen Division (AWD) 
and the Base, both of which are discussed in detail in this thesis. 
Moreover, domestic violent extremists today are more likely to be affiliated with 
or linked transnationally to groups that support an all-encompassing global movement with 
the same ethnocentric goals while still focusing their efforts and violence on the country or 
region in which they reside. An example of this connection came the day after the 
insurrection rioters took the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Azov Battalion leader Serhiy 
Korotkikh, among an array of Eastern European and Balkan far-right cohorts, expressed 
support: “The Whites, finally, have decided to act and are taking over the Capitol building. 
. . . The Whites are still here, and we know what to do.”7 In another instance, two foreign 
members of the Base, a U.S. organization, are currently being denied release by a judge in 
 
6 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla, “Eyewitness Accounts from Recent Defectors from Islamic 
State: Why They Joined, What They Saw, Why They Quit,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 6 (2015): 95–
118; Ben Makuch, “Russia-Based Neo-Nazi Terror Leader Offers Training to American Far Right,” VICE 
World News, January 19, 2021, https://www.vice.com/en/article/3anj8w/russia-based-neo-nazi-terror-
leader-offers-training-to-american-far-right. 
7 Robert Coalson, “‘We Know What to Do’: Far-Right Figures across Eastern Europe Applaud U.S. 
Capitol Violence,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 7, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/far-right-
figures-across-eastern-europe-applaud-us-capitol-violence/31038085.html. 
4 
the Netherlands as the authorities investigate their crimes, including “right-wing extremist 
incitement.”8  
International partners and allies are recognizing REMVE organizations and actors 
as a threat. Hannah Jackson reported on an evolving situation in Canada’s parliament 
wherein members of parliament unanimously voted in favor of “us [ing] all the available 
tools to address the proliferation of white supremacists and hate groups starting with . . . 
immediately designating the Proud Boys as a terrorist entity.”9 Canada’s current list of 73 
designated terrorist entities include the AWD, the Base, the Proud Boys, the Russian 
Imperialism Movement, Combat 18, the Taliban, al-Qaida, and IS.10  
This thesis argues, in an effort to more effectively counter domestic U.S. REMVE 
organizations, the HSE will need to recalibrate how it perceives and categorizes domestic 
U.S. REMVE organizations or actors. Moreover, the HSE will need to acknowledge and 
leverage the transnational elements and reach of domestic U.S. REMVE organizations or 
actors. Authorities should no longer treat these threats as domestic, as they do not reside 
solely in the United States, but instead investigate and prosecute them as the transnationally 
linked actors and organizations that they are. By the end, this thesis will show that the 
precedent has been established for allowing national security concerns to supersede 
concerns about constitutional protections, and it should be applied equally in cases of white 
nationalist extremists with international connections.  
 
8 Wilmer Heck, “Steven and Fabio Advocated Violence for a ‘White Ethnostate’ and Are Now on 
Trial,” NRC, January 20, 2021, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/01/20/steven-en-fabio-willen-een-witte-
etnostaat-a4028488. 
9 Hannah Jackson, “MPs Unanimously Agree to Urge Feds to Designate Proud Boys a Terrorist 
Entity,” Global News, January 25, 2021, https://globalnews.ca/news/7598355/motion-passes-proud-boys-
terrorists/. 
10 “Currently Listed Entities,” Public Safety Canada, June 21, 2019, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/
cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx; Public Safety Canada, “Government of Canada 
Lists 13 New Groups as Terrorist Entities and Completes Review of Seven Others,” Government of 




The federal government is recognizing the growing threat of REMVE violence. In 
the last two years, the FBI and DHS, in separate statements, testified before Congress 
regarding REMVE violence. The FBI attested that deaths from REMVE attacks outnumber 
those caused by foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), and the bureau continues to 
reinforce REMVE violence as a top-level priority.11 In 2019, DHS published a strategic 
framework defining REMVE violence as “targeted violence aimed at individuals based on 
their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, gender and gender 
identity.”12 Moreover, these groups are increasingly violent toward law enforcement, even 
in their own communities.13  
Even as the federal government acknowledges the REMVE problem set, U.S. law 
enforcement and the Intelligence Community are hindered in leveraging certain tools or 
approaches to mitigate FTO threats. International and domestic terrorism are defined 
similarly, starting with the following three elements:  
[They] (1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, (2) violate 
federal or state criminal laws or would do so if committed in the jurisdiction 
of the United States or any state, [and] (3) appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation of coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.14  
The chief difference is the fourth element, which speaks directly to the location of the 
terrorism; for international terrorism, it “occur [s] primarily outside the territorial 
 
11 Christopher Wray, “FBI Oversight: Statement before the House Judiciary Committee,” Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, February 5, 2020, https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-oversight-020520. 
12 Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for 
Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 
10, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0920_plcy_strategic-framework-countering-
terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf. 
13 Aris Folley, “FBI Warns White Supremacists Encouraging Members to Spread Coronavirus to Law 
Enforcement, Jews: Report,” Hill (blog), March 22, 2020, https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/
news/488919-fbi-white-supremacists-encouraging-members-to-spread. 
14 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012), quoted in Mary McCord, “It’s Time for Congress to Make Domestic 
Terrorism a Federal Crime,” Lawfare (blog), December 5, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-
congress-make-domestic-terrorism-federal-crime. 
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jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend [s] the national boundaries.”15 Domestic 
terrorism, on the other hand, is “primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.”16  
Take, for example, the following scenarios. When a homegrown violent extremist 
pledges allegiance to an FTO, even if that actor resides in the United States and his 
terroristic actions focus on the homeland, officials consider the actor a member of an FTO. 
On the other hand, if the actor is a homegrown violent extremist who supports white 
supremacy or white ethnonationalism and resides in the United States—and whose 
terroristic actions focus on the homeland—multiple cases have shown that officials will 
not consider the actor a terrorist nor his/her actions terrorism. Examples of the latter are 
manifest in Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing, Robert Bowers’s attack at the 
Pittsburgh Tree of Life synagogue, and Dylann Roof’s mass murder at the Charleston, 
South Carolina, church shooting. This duality limits the United States’ ability to recognize 
terrorism and leverage similar tools against domestic REMVE organizations or actors.  
REMVEs are an under-policed population in the United States, often because the 
First, Second, and Fourth Amendment sensitivities involved make arrests and prosecutions 
difficult due to the actors’ status as U.S. citizens.17 The United States uses the designation 
of an FTO as a tool to exert influence on foreign organizations. One valuable aspect of 
designating transnational domestic REMVE actors or organizations terrorist organizations 
would be to signal to their international partners that the United States understands the 
threat that transnational domestic terrorists pose to international security.  
Transnational domestic violent extremists are using transnational REMVE 
partnerships to transform U.S. domestic violent extremist organizations into transnational 
organizations. As such, transnationally linked domestic violent extremists should be 
considered a collective entity and, thus, a member of an FTO. Many of these groups may 
 
15 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C). 
16 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(C). 
17 David E. Heller, “Designating Domestic Terrorist Individuals or Groups” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2010), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5213. 
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act domestically, but with their international influence and connections, they can no longer 
be defined solely as a domestic entity. Furthermore, this new distinction opens options for 
the United States to leverage the foreign country designation and sanctions as legal grounds 
in designating REMVE actors or organizations with transnational ties.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
How do emerging trends in REMVEs challenge U.S. homeland security legal and 
judicial frameworks? How could the homeland security enterprise more effectively combat 
the transnational threat of REMVE violence?  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To understand emerging trends in the domestic violent extremist movement, an 
analysis of academic articles, open-source reporting, and government testimony or 
announcements was completed. This research studied the corresponding ideology behind 
the current increase in anti-government and ethnonationalism sentiment, the use of social 
media by U.S. domestic violent extremists, and the new global connection among 
transnational actors or organizations.  
In order to understand the challenges this new cohort of violent extremists presents 
to the U.S. HSE, this thesis describes the legal and judicial mechanisms that categorize 
international and domestic terrorism in the United States. That effort entailed exploring the 
boundaries of U.S. definitions of international and domestic terrorism and discussing the 
federal statutes criminalizing international terrorism and the predicate crime criteria for 
domestic terrorism. This legal analysis establishes the foundation that either enables or 
prevents federal authorities from investigating and prosecuting domestic terrorism—more 
specifically, focusing on U.S. Supreme Court decisions on First and Fourth Amendment 
protections and limitations. Special attention was paid to how precedent shapes 
investigative and prosecutorial capabilities. This legal analysis conformed to the issues, 
rules, analysis, and conclusion formula.18 
 
18 “The IRAC Formula,” Law Nerds, accessed May 25, 2020, https://lawnerds.com/guide/irac.html. 
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This thesis then demonstrates the emerging trends in the United States and the ways 
these groups’ activities, ideological community, and recruitment transcend borders in case 
studies.19 Qualitatively evaluating new phenomena in U.S. REMVEs reveals the extent to 
which evolving capabilities allow these groups to circumvent detection and prosecution. 
This evaluation includes a descriptive and comparative analysis of their ideology, 
motivation, structure, use of digital platforms, links to international like-minded groups, 
and affiliation to international violent extremists.20 The organizations—the AWD and the 
Base—were selected because of their similarities and relationship to one another. Both 
have evolved transnationally, but this nascent trend is bettered viewed through the lens of 
an established organization versus an emerging one. This thesis concludes with 
recommendations based on the aforementioned research and provides policymakers with 
options for mitigating the threat posed by transnational REMVE organizations and actors.  
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
This thesis begins with a literature review in Chapter II, which covers several trends 
in U.S. domestic and transnational REMVEs. This chapter analyzes emerging trends in 
REMVE ideology and motivation and employs theory to frame the possible explanations 
for the recent increase in REMVE violence. The chapter concludes with an exploration of 
the digital media ecosystem (DME) and how it has empowered REMVE organizations to 
transcend national borders and become a transnational movement. Chapter III assesses the 
U.S. federal government’s response to and/or mitigation of threats and acts of international 
and domestic terrorism. Specifically, it reveals how this response is bifurcated by the 
current definitions and legal frameworks—and challenges the collective status quo. 
Chapter IV examines two transnationally linked REMVE organizations through 
descriptive case studies of how REMVE movements begin, evolve, and develop through 
the lens of an established organization versus an emergent one. In conclusion, this thesis 
posits that acknowledging not only the commonalities between international and domestic 
 
19 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and 
Implementation for Novice Researchers,” Qualitative Report 13, no. 4 (2008): 544–59, https://nsuworks.
nova.edu/tqr/vol13/iss4/2/. 
20 Baxter and Jack. 
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terrorism but also the real threat REMVE organizations pose could be a paradigm shift in 
how the United States mitigates the threat of transnational domestic violent extremists. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review discusses several emerging trends in U.S. domestic terrorism 
and transnational violent extremism. It starts with the convergence of certain key events 
including the 2008 election of the first African-American president, the introduction of 
smartphones, and the explosion of social media.21 These trends may have facilitated an 
increase in domestic terrorism in the United States—shifting from physical engagements 
to an expanding DME to further terrorist efforts—and the unique commingling of unknown 
actors and known right-wing extremists, understood in this chapter through the concept of 
social identity theory and hive terrorism. 
Some terrorism scholars predicted a rise in domestic terrorism following the 
election of Barack Obama in 2008.22 A DHS assessment published the next year warned 
that the election of an African-American president could boost recruitment and 
radicalization of right-wing extremists.23 While this DHS qualitative assessment could not 
quantify the recruitment value, the number of domestic terror attacks increased after 2008, 
and it continues to rise.24 Few anticipated the impact smart phones and social media would 
have on spreading propaganda or creating networks—despite their ubiquitous presence 
now. As Peter Bergen et al. describe in their piece for New America, “The increasing role 
of social media and the internet . . . in crafting messages to radicalize and recruit 
 
21 David Squires, “History and Different Types of Social Media,” Everything You Always Wanted to 
Know about Social Media: (But Were Too Afraid to Ask) (blog), October 12, 2016, https://scalar.usc.edu/
works/everything-you-always-wanted-to-know-about-social-media-but-were-too-afraid-to-ask/history-and-
different-types-of-social-media. 
22 Seth G. Jones, The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-far-right-extremism-united-
states. 
23 Steven Aftergood, “DHS Sees Resurgence in Rightwing Extremism,” Federation of American 
Scientists (blog), April 14, 2009, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2009/04/rightwing_extremism/. 
24 Jessica Rivinius, “Global Terrorism Decreases in 2018 as Recent Uptick in U.S. Terrorist Attacks 




individuals” is consistent across the extremist paradigm.25 Indeed, Bergen et al. have 
calculated that 52 percent of extremists radicalized online.26 A report completed by the 
University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism confirmed a steady increase in attacks motivated by far-right extremism in the 
United States, from fewer than 10 in 2007 to 35 attacks in 2017; conversely, world-wide 
terror attacks between 2014 and 2018 have dropped 43 percent.27 The argument that U.S. 
domestic violent extremists of the REMVE persuasion are a more deadly threat in the 
United States is evidenced by data collected by New America.28 The 2018–2020 analysis 
by Peter Bergen et al. illustrates that for every death caused by international terrorists, 11 
deaths were caused by U.S. domestic violent extremists.29 Bergen et al. assert that since 9/
11, far-right terrorism has been more deadly than foreign terrorism.30 Thus, the prediction 
of an uptick in right-wing terrorism seems to have support. 
A. IDEOLOGY AND MOTIVATION 
The shared ideological objectives of contemporary REMVEs align with two 
ideologies, one being accelerationism.31 Accelerationism, based on classical Marxist 
concepts, describes how such forces as unrestrained capitalism will intensify to a point of 
self-destruction and ultimately cause a systematic collapse.32 In the 1990s, British 
philosopher Nick Land “argued that the triumph of capitalism and the rise of techno-culture 
 
25 Peter Bergen et al., “Part III. Why Do They Engage in Terrorism?,” New America, accessed 
February 2, 2021, http://newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/why-do-they-commit-terrorist-acts/. 
26 Bergen et al. 
27 Rivinius, “Global Terrorism Decreases in 2018.” 
28 Peter Bergen et al., “Part IV. What Is the Threat to the United States Today?,” New America, 
accessed February 2, 2021, http://newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-
today/. 
29 Bergen et al. 
30 Bergen et al. 
31 Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner, The “Great Replacement”: The Violent Consequences of 
Mainstreamed Extremism (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, July 2019), https://www.isdglobal.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/07/The-Great-Replacement-The-Violent-Consequences-of-Mainstreamed-
Extremism-by-ISD.pdf. 
32 Stephen Yang, “A Marxist Lens on the Digital Age—Part 1,” Cornell Daily Sun, March 2, 2020, 
https://cornellsun.com/2020/03/02/yang-a-marxist-lens-on-the-digital-age-part-1/. 
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were inextricably intertwined.”33 In articulating this fringe concept, Land reasoned “the 
self . . . was being dissolved by the increasing speed and pace of modern life—the 
individual was becoming less important than the techno-capitalist system it found itself 
in.”34 Land’s philosophical analysis of Marxism and technology has evolved into the basis 
for modern-day accelerationism. The basic tenets of accelerationism are not linked to 
violence, but as Joanna Mendelson, senior investigative researcher for the Anti-Defamation 
League, explains, “It’s not an ideology that exists in a theoretical sense . . . [but] an ideology 
that has actually manifested in real-world violence.”35  
REMVE actors or organizations accept the concept of acceleration, but instead of 
focusing on capitalism, they have adapted the narrative to accelerate polarization to induce 
a race war that will cause the collapse of society as it is known and rebuild it as a white 
ethno-state.36 Supporting the concept of preserving ethno-states is French identarian 
Guillaume Faye, who focused on the French identarian principles of “struggl [ing] for the 
heritage of our ancestors and the future for our children,” explaining that “the basis of 
everything is biocultural identity and demographic renewal.”37 In Chapter III, the case 
studies of REMVE organizations—the AWD and the Base—demonstrate the prevalence 
of accelerationism in violent extremist movements and both organizations’ embrace of the 
theory to bring about political revolution.38 Notably, organizations that support the 
accelerationist theory generally grapple with what they perceive to be an existential 
dilemma—that the white race is on the verge of extinction and that multiculturalism, 
through global migration, coupled with women’s rights and the “Jewish agenda,” has 
destroyed civilization. Faye agues in his book Why We Fight similar concepts regarding 
 
33 Yang. 
34 Zack Beauchamp, “The Extremist Philosophy That’s More Violent Than the Alt-Right and 
Growing in Popularity,” Vox, November 18, 2019, https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/11/11/
20882005/accelerationism-white-supremacy-christchurch. 
35 Beauchamp. 
36 Davey and Ebner, Great Replacement, 13. 
37 Guillaume Faye, Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Resistance (London: Arktos Media, 
2011), 37–38. 
38 Davey and Ebner, Great Replacement, 13. 
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the loss of the French identity due to globalization and the French people’s supporting their 
own demise by accepting the “dogma of a non-ethnic state.”39  
Ethnonationalism is another ideology that motivates REMVE organizations or 
actors. This theory aligns with the cultural, ethnic, and racial ultra-nationalism, all of which 
hold that races should not intermingle and that migrants must assimilate to the host 
country’s societal norms.40 As Faye concludes, “[The] belief that aliens can be assimilated 
and integrated, as they defend and maintain the specificities of their original culture . . . [is] 
one of the most noxious [maxims] of all, particularly dear to out ‘ethnopluralist’ 
intellectuals.”41 Yet another way to view ethnonationalism is “loyalty to a particular ethnic 
or racial group . . . creating resistance to cultural and educational imposition by other 
groups.”42 As the Soufan Center reported in mid-2020, the state of societal affairs with 
Black Lives Matter protests and COVID-19 has created a petri dish for racial tensions to 
flourish; furthermore, ethnonationalists perceive the current societal climate as 
instrumental in creating a white ethno-state.43 Academia has noticed that social and racial 
tensions have risen in society writ large. As highlighted in Forrest Cullings’s thesis, the 
term alt-right had been previously established, but it was not until the 2016 presidential 
election that it gained traction.44 Cullings explains, “Presidential candidate Trump’s 
hardline rhetoric on immigration fell in line with [the] Alt-Right belief . . . gained 
momentum through the presidential election season but lost that momentum . . . when the 
Alt-Right’s Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia resulted in several injuries and 
 
39 Faye, Why We Fight, 42. 
40 Niki Sterkenburg, A Practical Introduction to Far-Right Extremism (Amsterdam: Radicalisation 
Awareness Network Centre of Excellence, 2019), 7, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/
files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ran_fre_factbook_
20191205_en.pdf. 
41 Faye, Why We Fight, 84. 
42 “What Is Ethno-Nationalism?,” Edupedia (blog), accessed December 23, 2020, https://www.
theedadvocate.org/edupedia/content/what-is-ethno-nationalism/. 
43 Jason Blazakis et al., The Atomwaffen Division: The Evolution of the White Supremacy Threat 
(New York: Soufan Center, 2020), 8, https://thesoufancenter.org/research/the-atomwaffen-division-the-
evolution-of-the-white-supremacy-threat/. 
44 Forrest Cullings, “Alt-Right Influence on the Radicalization of White Nationalists in the United 
States, According to Significance Quest Theory” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), 28, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/65496. 
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one death.”45 Not lost was the sentiment or the perceived permission for certain segments 
of U.S. society to express their hate through vitriol and action.  
While not all ethnonationalists are accelerationists, when ethnonationalists do 
believe in the concept of accelerationism, they are more willing and eager to ignite an 
all-out race war to create chaos and assist in society’s collapse. What do these groups 
believe will happen after society has collapsed? They believe a new ultra-national white 
ethno-state will be erected to take the place of the collapsed society.46 
B. THEORY 
While theory is not central to this thesis, theoretical models from social psychology 
can serve to explain some of the underlying drivers or motivations of REMVE actors. 
Applying theory can be helpful for those seeking to understand why and how someone 
comes to embrace hate and racist narratives. This section discusses social identity theory 
(SIT) and the social identity analytical method (SIAM), as well as the emerging but 
relevant hive theory, in order to describe how and why vulnerable individuals radicalize.  
In assessing an individual’s motivation to seek a certain in-group, the context that 
shapes the individual’s need to belong is a crucial factor. SIT is a theory that allows for 
understanding relationships between groups and how these relationships shape individual 
behavior within groups.47 The theory suggests that belonging to a group, the in-group, can 
affect one’s self-image and how one feels about that self-image. Whether those feelings 
are positive or negative, such as pride or shame, depends not only on the in-group’s own 
achievements but also on comparisons with groups to which one does not belong, or 
out-groups. Human beings have a need for their social identities to be positive, and groups 
have an inbuilt need for being positively evaluated, or else they may lose members and 
 
45 Cullings, 28. 
46 Counter Extremism Project, James Mason’s Siege: Ties to Extremists (New York: Counter 
Extremism Project, 2019), https://www.counterextremism.com/james-masons-siege-ties-to-extremists. 
47 Anders Strindberg, Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism and Violent Extremism 
(Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2020), 26. 
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disintegrate.48 This means that people are drawn to groups that they believe can provide a 
positive social identity to “people like them.” It also means that once people are in a group 
and compare it to an out-group, the evaluation is inherently discriminating in favor of the 
in-group. In times of conflict, these evaluations lead to an exaggerated view of the positive 
qualities of the in-group and its members and also of the negative characteristics of the 
out-group and its members.49 This provides motivation for continued conflict that, in turn, 
forms various patterns of behavior that can be analyzed and understood.  
The social-psychological factors of SIT help explain the underlying influences on 
individuals who seek to develop an alt-right in-group and out-group narrative to validate 
their beliefs and externalize new social norms—they seek a community and search for 
extremists or extremism on the DME. This motivation is shaped by his or her perceived 
“positive value” of self, and that definition of self is shaped by—but not limited to—
political, historical, cultural, or economic contexts.50 The individual will rely on the 
in-group to indicate how to relate and interact with out-groups. Conversely, since the 
in-group requires a positive socially constructed identity, it relies on the individual to 
provide positive value to the group, as the “individual contributes to the identity of the 
group.”51 Also, it is worth noting that no one belongs to a single in-group, but it is 
necessary “to understand his or her dominant sources of social identification, and how they 
compare in status and strength with other competing sources of social identification.”52 
In their book A Practitioner’s Way Forward, David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and 
Anders Strindberg have sought to adapt SIT-based analysis to practitioners’ needs by 
adding four “analytical markers” based on anthropological research into small groups in 
 
48 Strindberg, Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism, 27; William A. Gamson, 
“Commitment and Agency in Social Movements,” Sociological Forum 6, no. 1 (1991): 27–50, https://doi.
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49 Strindberg, Social Identity Theory and the Study of Terrorism, 14. 
50 David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, A Practitioners Way Forward: Terrorism 
Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 26, 55. 
51 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, 51. 
52 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioners Way Forward, 55; Michael A. Hogg and 
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Processes (London: Routledge, 1988), 12–16. 
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conflict with other groups.53 This approach is referred to as the social identity analytical 
method (SIAM).54 The markers are particular aspects of group dynamics that are “highly 
relevant when analyzing . . . strong collective identity,” and two are particularly useful in 
this thesis.55 
One of these markers is honor and shame, and the model calls for identifying 
behaviors that embody the effort to avoid shame and demonstrate honor. Examples of this 
dynamic are recent domestic terrorist attacks by such perpetrators as Dylann Roof, John 
Earnest, and Patrick Crusius. The honor challenge is the quintessential premise of these 
attacks. Each of these domestic terrorists internalized the fear that his social status was in 
jeopardy by the mere existence and elevation of minority groups, be they ethnic or 
religious, in his country. Through the DME, terrorists socialize their beliefs or observations 
and validate the legitimacy of the in-group’s beliefs through the consumption of alt-right 
extremist propaganda and socially constructed conspiracy theories. Honor and status 
within their homelands are called into question when the coexisting population is 
ethnically, racially, and culturally different from the organic population of the homeland.  
Another analytical marker is the limited good, which “is intimately connected to 
the patron and client relationship.”56 The basic assumption is that small clandestine 
militant groups such as terrorist groups believe that they are competing with out-groups for 
limited tangible or intangible goods, such as land, status, and political power, and the model 
calls for identifying such behavior. An example of this dynamic comes from the 
identitarian worldview. In his book Why We Fight, Guillaume portrays this tension as a 
clash between Europe and the Muslim world—“an overcrowded humanity, crammed on a 
sick planet, engag [ing] its decisive struggle for survival.”57 Some of the more recent 
transnationally influenced domestic terrorists have made the same assertion that 
 
53 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioners Way Forward.  
54 David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, A Practitioners Way Forward: Terrorism 
Analysis, 2nd ed. (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, forthcoming). 
55 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg. 
56 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, 79. 
57 Faye, Why We Fight, 38. 
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globalization will accelerate the scarcity of resources. Both Brenton Tarrant and Patrick 
Crusius, concerned about “green nationalism,” expressed the need to reduce the 
consumption of limited goods—natural resources—by immigrants, who they considered 
leeches on society by their mere coexistence with the white race.58 
Just as the medium in which extremists communicate has changed, so has their 
social commingling. Terrorism expert Daniel Koehler describes how previously 
unassociated extremist activists developed in-group networks and organized around shared 
opposition to democratic governments and immigration to commit spontaneous REMVE 
acts.59 His hive terrorism theory attempts to explain the recent increase in REMVE 
sentiment and violence. In studying this emerging dynamic, Koehler examined the 2015–
2016 refugee crisis in Germany. He identified the unusual intermixing of long-term 
radicalized extremists and individuals with no known nexus to REMVE activities or 
groups. Koehler’s study suggests that the most influential aspect of this developing trend 
was governing authorities’ unwillingness to label acts of extremism as terrorism, which 
created a void filled by new societal and legal norms. Kohler posits that if acceptable 
behavior is not defined by social or legal frameworks, the threshold for contact between 
ordinary people and highly radicalized extremists is lowered, and that contact becomes 
more fluid and acceptable. Domestic terrorism does not look or operate as it did in 1995 or 
even 2011, so understanding the legal constraints of investigating and prosecuting domestic 
terrorism is vital to mitigating the REMVE threat. The legal constraints are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter III. 
C. DIGITAL MEDIA ECOSYSTEM 
Since 2008, technology and digital platforms have changed how the world 
communicates and receives information. The introduction of the smartphone made real-
time access to news, blogs, and social media—once unimaginable—available anytime. 
 
58 Brenton Tarrant, The Great Replacement (self-pub., 2019); Patrick Crusius, “The Inconvenient 
Truth,” Randall Packer (blog), accessed March 19, 2021, https://randallpacker.com/wp-content/uploads/
2019/08/The-Inconvenient-Truth.pdf. 
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Building on David Rapoport’s concept of the four waves of modern terrorism, scholars 
postulate an emerging trend in contemporary violent extremism: the fifth wave of 
terrorism.60 The fifth wave shifts the terrain from in-person events to the DME to radicalize 
and build a sense of belonging and a social media-derived identity.61 The DME—which 
Jessie Daniels, Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis, and others refer to as a collection of 
echo chambers—is an assembly of transnational individuals espousing racially or 
ethnically racist ideologies—for example, the great replacement, white genocide, cultural 
Marxism, or accelerationism—on multiple digital platforms.62 These theories all share the 
fear of extinction of the white race through immigration and multiculturalism.63 Thus, the 
DME has shifted how people congregate, radicalize, and develop their own social identity. 
Edwin Hodge and Helga Hallgrimsdottir explore this concept in describing the 
social movement of the DME as borderless, abstract, and fluid.64 This movement is 
geographically nationless and does not seek a permanent home but thrives in the dialogue 
of extremist ideology posted on imageboards, chans, and blogs. Likewise, in her paper, 
Jessie Daniels postulates that simple searches in the DME confirm racist perspectives and 
amplify those perspectives through algorithms that direct individuals to like-minded sites 
and discussion boards.65 Finally, in a recent journal article, terrorism scholars Seth Jones, 
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Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington assert that the DME will remain a constant in the 
violent extremist milieu, as it is a vital medium for domestic terrorists to collaborate, 
radicalize, reach an otherwise inaccessible population, and coordinate around the world.66 
This distinction is important because it is apparent the DME plays a strong role in 
perpetuating the movement in virtual space.  
The make-up of the DME is fundamental to its exploitation by extremists. The 
“global online hate ecology” comprises “self-organized, mesoscale clusters that 
interconnect to form a resilient network-of-networks of hate highways across platforms, 
countries and languages.”67 Johnson et al. explain, “Current hate networks [are] rapidly 
rewiring and self-repairing . . . when attacked, in a way that mimics the formation of 
covalent bonds in chemistry.”68 It is the electrostatic attraction of the give and take of ideas 
that makes the global online hate ecology work so well within the DME. While each digital 
platform plays a unique role in the global online hate ecology, the subparts intertwine to 
create the DME. If a vulnerable individual is starting the radicalization process, he or she 
can start with a simple Google search, just as Dylann Roof did when he searched “black 
on white crime.”69 The use of social news aggregators like Reddit or the video-sharing site 
YouTube are easily accessible and provide readers with additional articles or videos based 
on their viewing history. Essentially, if a user “likes” one white nationalist video, YouTube 
will sustain his thirst for more.  
The world of social networking services includes Facebook and its internal 
live-streaming platform Facebook Live; Parler, the self-dubbed “unbiased social media 
[with] . . . free expression without violence and no censorship”; and Gab, “the free speech 
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alternative to Twitter” and “defend [er] of free expression and individual liberty online.”70 
These social networking services are used to connect individuals with similar interests and 
hobbies. Once a connection has been made through a digital platform, invited users can 
talk in a secure manner through messenger encryption services such as Telegram, Threema, 
or Wire. Combine these mainstream platforms with dark web imageboards on 8chan, 
4chan, or 8kun platforms, and a vulnerable individual has the ability to lose oneself in 
accelerationism, ethnonationalism, white nationalism, or variants of Marxism. 
Violent extremists aim not only to push their message across the global online hate 
ecology but also to get mainstream media, such as CNN, NBC, or the New York Times, to 
discuss their ideas and use their language in national-level news pieces, thereby expanding 
their reach exponentially. One example of this need for notoriety was Brenton Tarrant’s 
use of Facebook live-streaming during his two mass attacks of mosques in Christchurch, 
New Zealand, in 2019. As Jason Burke notes, “The point of the attack [was] not just to kill 
Muslims, but to make a video of someone killing Muslims.”71 The original Christchurch 
video was viewed by fewer than 200 people, but the cascading effect was substantial. 
Within the first 24 hours, Tarrant’s attack video had been shared on Facebook more than 
1.5 million times.72 In an effort to contain the flow of hate across the DME, Facebook 
blocked approximately 1.2 million video uploads and removed 300,000 shared copies, and 
this was just one platform’s response.73 
The SITE Intelligence Group is also finding evidence of influence of the DME on 
REMVE actors and organizations. As uncovered in the SITE Intelligence Group’s research 
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on social media and the far-right, “Neo-Nazi and white nationalist groups now have in 
Telegram a centralized operational venue to network, recruit and distribute attack manuals, 
just as the Islamic State had for years.”74 The use of the DME to communicate with like-
minded individuals, radicalize an otherwise unreachable cohort, and connect with both 
U.S.- and foreign-based domestic terrorists is one of the aspects that makes this new 
generation of REMVE actors or organizations such an exponentially difficult threat to 
quantify.  
D. TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS 
One foreign terrorism trend being emulated by geographically disparate domestic 
violent extremists is the cross-pollination of ideology and inspiration across international 
borders. On October 30, 2019, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before the House 
Homeland Security Committee that some U.S.-based domestic terrorists are connecting 
with overseas counterparts to discuss like-minded topics and traveling overseas to receive 
training.75 FBI Director Wray also highlighted in his testimony that the FBI had identified 
a new phenomenon: REMVE actors inspired by overseas events and “communicating with 
each other in a more informal way online or in some other way inspiring each other.”76 
Following up on his previous testimony, in early 2020, Wray continued to trumpet the 
REMVE threat and the need to call REMVEs a “national threat priority.”77  
These overseas communications and collaboration are demonstrated by the 
transnational alliances the AWD and the Base have established through online discussions. 
Through shared ideology and objectives, the AWD has cultivated an organizational 
following and established branches in Germany with Atomwaffen Duetschland and the 
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Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD).78 The AWD has expanded to other countries such as the 
United Kingdom with allegiances with National Action and the SKD. Other allegiances 
have been established with the Feuerkrieg Division (FKD) in Estonia, the Antipodean 
Resistance in Australia, and Northern Order in Canada. The Base has expanded its 
affiliation in Canada, Finland, and Germany with the FKD.79 
U.S.-based REMVEs and overseas violent extremists may be geographically 
dispersed, but their ideology is not. As highlighted in Tim Lister’s piece, “The message of 
the far-right in Ukraine certainly struck a chord among white supremacists in the United 
States.”80 As Lister explains in his article for CTC Sentinel, this connection was 
documented through the anonymously leaked Iron March posts that described the 
transatlantic contributors’ mutual appreciation of their “shared racial identity.”81 One such 
documented connection, reported by terrorism experts, was between an Azov Battalion 
representative and the AWD’s Brandon Russell, who requested “some advice from you 
about my militia that I lead in the U.S.”82 
The current feeling among REMVE groups is a sense of uncertainty and anxiety 
about the future of society; furthermore, there appears to be a connection between the 
narrative of globalization and migration making Caucasians the new minority and the 
violence that ensues from that narrative. In his journal article, Lister notes, “The far-right 
extremist groups . . . rarely make explicit and specific calls for violence, but sometimes 
their sympathizers devise serious plots and carry out attacks, inspired by online forums, 
the ‘manifestos’ of others, and previous attacks.”83 
The transnational connections of disgruntled organizations have culminated in an 
ultra-nationalist movement that has not only validated violent extremists but also attracted 
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those on the fringes of the movement to buy into the theory of the great replacement and 
accelerationism—enticing them to take action when they normally would not. Terrorism 
expert Paul Jackson supports this concept in his white paper for the Program on Extremism 
at George Washington University. Jackson writes, “Such groups are not developing 
centrally directed terrorist attacks. Rather their role in violent radicalization is to help 
intensify and deepen wider vulnerabilities among some of their members.”84 Jackson’s 
position is supported by Ramon Spaaij’s work, which “stresses this is significant as 
ideology can provide the moral authority often needed for people to feel the necessity to 
carry out a violent attack.”85 
All of this leads to the fact that violent extremists provide the ideas, allow the ideas 
to marinate, and feign surprise when someone acts violently toward their perceived 
out-group narratives, focused on minorities; feminists; Jews; and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, queer (LGBTQ) community. In his thesis on identitarian violence, 
Christopher Adamczyk argues, “Identitarianism is a complex socio-political worldview . . 
. [an] inherently violent movement with the sole mission of ensuring European culture and 
ethnicity survive.”86 Adamczyk posits that the use of violence by identitarians is not only 
a form of action but also a perspective through which they view their ethnocentric 
struggle.87 He explains that this “culture of violence, combined with the ever-present risk 
of erasure, is the primary motivator.”88 Homegrown violent extremists are using the legal 
blanket of the First Amendment to spread vitriol and then shield themselves from owning 
the violence they incite. It is time that U.S. authorities transition from viewing violent 
extremists as a First Amendment issue to concentrating on the deeds committed because 
of their words.  
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III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Even as the federal government acknowledges that REMVE attacks, committed 
domestically by U.S. citizens, well may constitute terrorism, U.S. law enforcement and the 
Intelligence Community are hindered in leveraging certain tools or approaches regularly 
used to mitigate FTO threats. Specifically, because domestic REMVE organizations 
usually comprise U.S. citizens, who are protected by legal rights that do not extend to 
foreign actors, they are harder to surveil, investigate, and prosecute.89  
The debate about mitigating the threat of domestic violent extremists inevitably 
stagnates when scholars begin to discuss how to counter the extremism threat. Debates 
begin and end with the Constitution of the United States—more specifically, the First, 
Second, and Fourth Amendments provide citizens with the rights used to answer why so 
little can be done to mitigate this threat. To be sure, domestic terrorism is defined similarly 
to international terrorism. Both definitions include the following elements:  
[They] (1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, (2) violate 
federal or state criminal laws or would do so if committed in the jurisdiction 
of the United States or any state, [and] (3) appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation of coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.90  
The chief difference is the fourth element, which speaks directly to the location of the 
terrorism; for international terrorism, it “occur [s] primarily outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend [s] the national boundaries.”91 Domestic 
terrorism, on the other hand, is “primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.”92 The other chief difference between international and domestic terrorism it that 
international terrorism has been criminalized at the federal level whereas domestic 
terrorism has been criminalized only in a handful of states; it is not a federal crime, per se.  
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Multiple sources have discussed the different aspects of U.S. citizens’ right to 
assemble, speak freely, and be free of overreaching surveillance by their government. 
Scholars agree that balancing privacy and civil liberties with national security measures is 
precarious. As Bryan J. Ballantyne suggests, the historical examples of the unchecked 
authority of the U.S. government to surveil radical groups relate to the current social 
political climate.93 Ballantyne supports his argument with a socio-political study by Best, 
Kreuger, and Pearson-Merkowitz, which concludes that “a significant number of ordinary 
Americans feel anxious about domestic surveillance and that it has a negative impact on 
their attitudes regarding domestic counterterrorism policy.”94 Ballantyne elaborates that 
when the federal government believes it is in the best interest of U.S. national security, 
constitutional rights have historically been infringed to protect the populace. 
Conversely, David E. Heller speaks to Americans’ willingness to surrender some 
liberties for safety.95 Heller’s research explains that a “population that has been victimized 
by a terrorism event will display various levels of resiliency and [political] tolerance in 
order to cope with the present and future.”96 He summarizes that the U.S. citizens’ 
tolerance of infringements of privacy and freedom will fluctuate somewhere between 
societal norms and legal parameters.97 Scholars who analyzed the social-psychological 
environment in the aftermath of 9/11 support this point. For example, Mullen et al. posit, 
“After 9/11 Americans were willing to sacrifice some of their civil liberties.”98 Boyne goes 
a step further, maintaining that quintessential U.S. values will be revealed in the way the 
country balances civil liberties and protection for its people.99 How, if at all, does the 
discussion change when terrorists are U.S. homegrown violent extremists affiliated with 
transnational domestic terrorist organizations? 
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This chapter describes the federal U.S. response to and/or mitigation of threats and 
acts of international and domestic terrorism. Specifically, it reveals how this response is 
bifurcated in terms of definitional and legal frameworks, which describe who is authorized 
to act on behalf of the government and how acts and threats may be investigated and 
possibly prosecuted. The chapter also discusses the ways in which the Intelligence 
Community (IC) or the Department of Defense (DOD) can legally assist in investigations. 
It then provides a short history of domestic surveillance of domestic groups and concludes 
with a comparative case study that demonstrates the differences between international and 
domestic terrorism investigations and prosecutions.  
A. BIFURCATION 
Several divisions, broadly related, bifurcate the U.S. counterterrorism response—
surveillance, investigation, or prosecution. Perhaps the most significant bifurcation lies in 
the Constitution; other legal distinctions flow from it. This section examines the bases and 
forms of this bifurcation, which, in turn, establish very different options and regimes. 
1. First and Fourth Amendment Protections 
Citizens of the United States or resident aliens are guaranteed civil liberty 
protections under the U.S. Constitution that are not provided to nonresident aliens—the 
Constitution establishes the law of the land only in the United States. By and large, the 
First and the Fourth Amendments prominently shape how the United States mitigates 
terrorism, particularly the U.S. government’s bifurcation of violent extremists. That is, 
domestic terrorists are viewed and analyzed under the First Amendment while terrorists 
with international connections are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.  
Free expression—and the other elements of the First Amendment—were 
sufficiently important to the Founding Fathers that they made it top priority in the Bill of 
Rights, and it remains a fairly absolute freedom in U.S. practice today.100 The 
constitutional requirements for any measure that might limit a citizen’s First Amendment 
freedoms are hard for any law or agency to acquiesce. Violent extremists are well aware of 
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their First Amendment rights and use those protections to insulate themselves from U.S. 
government interference.  
As established in the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”101 With this protection, U.S. 
citizens can say anything, even vitriolic speech that intimidates and coerces the masses, 
with very little control by the government.102  
Among others, extremists in and of the United States rely on this protection to 
shield their gatherings, publications, and other communications from all but the most 
circumspect official oversight or intervention. Take, for example, the Unite the Right rally 
in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017. Protesters from the alt-right, white nationalists, and 
Klan members were allowed to protest over the removal of Confederate General Robert E. 
Lee’s statue and their perceived displacement of position—and, therefore, power—in 
modern society.103 While protesting, they were free to express all manner of hateful 
speech, such as the Nazi-affiliated slogan “blood and soil,” and display such white 
nationalist symbols as Confederate flags and Nazi symbols—even though these emblems 
provoked outrage or fear among other citizens, for example, residents of the areas where 
the protests took place.104 Couching their chants and assembly as political—and 
occasionally religious—expression, REMVEs wrap themselves in a thick layer of First 
Amendment protection.  
George Joseph documented for ProPublica the leaked chat room conversations of 
REMVE actors on Discord that revealed an anticipation and desire for violence before the 
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Unite the Right rally.105 Contrary to the elicited desire of violence discussed on Discord, 
white supremacist Evan McLaren—the executive director of Richard Spencer’s National 
Policy Institute—insisted that “what he characterized as ‘irreverent banter’ was ‘not 
relevant to what happened’ and did not spur the violence in Charlottesville.”106 As 
alt-right, white supremacists, or whatever name they choose, newly energized racists are 
quick to clarify that their words are just words; furthermore, they deflect any responsibility 
for the violent actions their words incite. 
To be sure, the First Amendment does not protect violence, not least because, in 
most instances, the First Amendment focuses on speech and, to some extent, expressive 
action.107 In the case of Sheik Abdel Rahman, when national security was confronted with 
a call to seditious action, the U.S. government shifted the boundary between speech and 
action.108 In 1993, the so-called Blind Sheik was indicted on sedition and conspiracy in 
relation to “conspiring to carry out a terrorist campaign of bombings and assassinations 
intended to destroy the United Nations and New York landmarks.”109 As Joseph Fried 
described, Abdel Rahman was the ideological leader behind the first World Trade Center 
attack; bombing plans targeting the United Nations headquarters, Lincoln and Holland 
tunnels, George Washington Bridge, and 26 Federal Plaza; and the assassination of Rabbi 
Meir Kahane, founder of the Jewish Defense League.110 Sheik Rahman’s defense team 
attempted to have the indictment against him dismissed based on the premise that Rahman 
had been performing pastoral duties, albeit as “subversive sermons and religious guidance 
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by the cleric to members of his flock.”111 Even after acknowledging the subversive nature 
of Rahman’s sermons, “the defense contended Mr. Abdel Rahman had only been 
exercising his free-speech rights.”112 The motion to dismiss was denied, and District Judge 
Mukasey, quoting the finding in United States v. Varani, ruled that “speech is not protected 
by the First Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself.”113 In the end, even 
religious speech is not protected when it leads to action. 
Another way that terroristic speech and assembly may fall out from under the broad 
protections of the First Amendment is when such expression is deemed to constitute 
“material support” for terrorists or other enemies of the United States.114 According to 
federal statute, providing material support includes, but is not limited to, tangible or 
intangible property, training, expert advice, or assistance.115 Expert advice or assistance 
specifically refers to “advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge.”116 Examples include knowledge in building a bomb or advice on 
how to circumvent U.S. surveillance. 
Freedom of speech is a guaranteed right under the Constitution; however, the 
violence it supports and enables is what truly matters. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court 
heard the case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, in which the Court decided the U.S. 
government can “suppress political expression and association in the name of national 
security.”117 The facts of the Humanitarian Law Project case revolve around plaintiffs 
who violated the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), amended by 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), by knowingly providing 
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material support or resources to two designated terrorist organizations—the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).118 In Roberts’s 
majority opinion, 
Plaintiffs claimed that the material-support statute was unconstitutional on 
two grounds: First, it violated their freedom of speech and freedom of 
association under the First Amendment, because it criminalized their 
provision of material support to the PKK and LTTE, without requiring the 
Government to prove that plaintiffs have a specific intent to further the 
unlawful ends of those organizations. . . . Second, plaintiffs argued that the 
statute was unconstitutionally vague.119 
The material support or resources in question involved the plaintiffs’ “want [ing] to ‘train 
members of [the] PKK on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully 
resolve disputes’ and ‘teach PKK member how to petition various representative bodies 
such as the United Nations for relief.’”120  
In its arguments, the court argued it is in the compelling interest of the United States 
to prevent terrorism. Whereas the AEDPA and IRTPA “mostly pertains [sic] to conduct, 
[conversely] it also covers some speech because the conduct to which the statute applies 
consists of communicating a message.”121 The crux of the ruling is “whether this interest 
[national security] justifies banning the speech of people who claim that they intend to 
advance on the non-terrorist objectives of the designated organizations.”122 The conflict 
discussed in the court decision was how one differentiates between the terrorist objectives 
and the non-terrorist objectives. The court answered, “In most situations, foreign terrorist 
groups do not separate social and political components from their terrorist enterprise.”123 
In other words, despite the plaintiffs’ altruistic goals of providing resources that taught 
recipients how to file for relief, their expert advice, in fact, materially supported both the 
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non-terroristic and terroristic objectives of designated terrorist organizations. As David 
Cole emphasizes, “The Court upheld the criminalization of speech . . . on the ground that 
such speech might unintentionally assist a third party in criminal wrongdoing.”124 First 
Amendment protections are the most fundamental rights U.S. citizens have; however, with 
the Humanitarian Law Project ruling, the court subjugated constitutional rights to national 
security interests.  
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable” search or seizures, 
including electronic surveillance within the United States. Specifically, it states, “The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”125 In other words, with some notable 
exceptions, the Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement secure a warrant based 
on probable cause for a search or seizure of a person, thing, or property to be legal.126 
The Fourth Amendment focuses exclusively, however, on the “rules of the game” 
for criminal prosecution—when and how the state may bring the full force of its coercive 
power to bear against a citizen or resident alien. If a court finds that the government acted 
improperly in a search or seizure, the state cannot use the ill-gotten evidence against the 
individual it seeks to prosecute.127 The penalty can be damaging to a particular case, as the 
doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” is an exclusionary rule that makes any evidence 
the state obtains through an illegal search inadmissible, for example, executing a wiretap 
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without a search warrant.128 Citizens, including domestic terrorists, are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a “reasonable” search and seizure be based on 
probable cause. Because no federal statutes criminalize domestic terrorism, the affiliation 
alone does not amount to probable cause.  
To the extent that the Constitution applies to international terrorism (or crime), the 
habits of the Fourth Amendment come into play if the case involves “acts for or on behalf 
of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States 
contrary to the interests of the United States.”129 Here, the latitude granted by a long-
established national security exception to the Fourth Amendment allows for “warrantless 
electronic surveillance of certain subjects under certain circumstances.”130 In Katz v. 
United States, the court opined, “Wiretapping to protect the security of the Nation has been 
authorized by successive Presidents. The present Administration would apparently save 
national security cases from restrictions against wiretapping.”131 In an effort to afford U.S. 
law enforcement maximum latitude while still protecting the core rights that the Fourth 
Amendment covers, “Congress . . . provid [ed] for a special court to hear requests for 
warrants for electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence situations . . . provided that the 
communications to be monitored are exclusively between or among foreign powers.”132 
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This court and its procedures were codified in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) of 1978, which authorized the collection of admissible evidence that could lead to 
federal terrorism and/or material support to terrorism charges brought against foreign 
violent extremists.133 In brief, when the U.S. government assesses that national security is 
in jeopardy and the actors are of foreign origin, the rules and restrictions regarding some 
extremists tend to be less restrictive. 
2. Criminalization, Designation, and Sanctions 
Legal definitions and frameworks are the fundamental aspects that both blanket and 
bifurcate international and domestic terrorism. The legal definitions are part and parcel in 
how criminal law may or may not be applied and who is authorized to assist in the U.S. 
government. Under the current legal framework, domestic terrorism is not a stand-alone 
crime; such a determination requires one or more contributing or “predicate” crimes. 
Notably, “crimes or actions may be considered predicate acts to a larger crime if they are 
related to, pave the way for, or have the same or similar purpose of the larger crime.”134 
On the one hand, because the predicate crimes are themselves prosecutable, there is little 
incentive to bring additional terrorism charges with the predicate crimes. This distinction 
is important because the requirement of a crime means that ideology—arguably even 
terroristic intent—alone is more or less beyond the reach of the domestic criminal justice 
system. The legal system means to punish an act of violence, not the ideology behind the 
action.  
In contrast, statutes and executive orders have established a robust apparatus for 
mitigating international terrorists; one established mechanism is the U.S. government’s 
designation of foreign violent extremists as terrorists. The 1996 AEDPA is a mechanism 
that “amends section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . , [which] states that 
the Secretary of State is authorized to designate an organization as a ‘foreign terrorist 
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organization’” and meets established criteria.135 Through Executive Orders 12947 and 
13224, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) has been 
delegated with the responsibility of consolidating and maintaining all federal government 
terrorism lists. This well-established and rigorous process of categorizing, classifying, and 
mitigating international terrorism begins with the U.S. government’s proclamation and 
designation of certain individuals or organizations as terrorist organizations or specially 
designated terrorists; furthermore, this is a tool only available in the international terrorism 
milieu. Once an individual or organization has been designated a terrorist or terrorist 
organization, the federal government has multiple means of recourse—that were 
previously unavailable—including financial sanctions against those entities or denial of 
immigration benefits. Through the AEDPA and OFAC, the United States can limit violent 
extremists’ recruitment capabilities and reduce their ability to raise funds.  
The process of placing individuals or organizations on the Department of State 
(DOS)’s FTO list or the Treasury Department’s specially designated terrorist list is an 
arduous and detailed task that is not done casually. During the designation process, the IC, 
DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the DOD assist with providing justification—
derogatory information and legal grounds for the terrorism designation of subjects and/or 
entities.136 All 17 IC members, including elements of the DOD’s operational and 
intelligence enterprises, as well as other supplemental agencies or departments, make 
personnel and resources available to identify, exploit, and mitigate the threat of terrorism 
and designate an organization an FTO; equally important is the DOS as the cornerstone of 
an FTO designation and a partner in international terrorism investigations.137 The DOS’s 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research coordinates and consolidates the information and 
provides it to the secretary of state for the designation nomination. 
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The U.S. designation and sanction mechanisms involve a push–pull function; 
without sanctions, designation has no weight. The DOS designates organizations for the 
FTO list, but once a group has been designated, OFAC then blocks financial transactions 
and criminalizes the action of providing funding or other material support to the group.138 
Without these mechanisms in place, there would be little leverage to apply against FTOs. 
U.S. law enforcement and government authorities have no such consequential enforcement 
tool in place to leverage against domestic terrorists. 
3. Intelligence and Investigations 
Foreign intelligence collection is a well-established framework to collect, develop, 
process, and synthesize information into intelligence. If an intelligence gap or need is 
identified, it is defined, collected, processed, and disseminated through specialized 
agencies, the IC, or branches of the U.S. military. One such specialized agency is the 
National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC).139 The NCTC delivers synthesized reporting 
but of a specific nature, “lead [ing] and integrat [ing] the national counter-terrorism (CT) 
effort by fusing foreign and domestic CT information . . . providing terrorism analysis . . . 
and driving the whole-of-government action.”140 It is through the collection of multiple 
intelligence sources (signals, geospatial, and human intelligence, among others) that highly 
trained intelligence professionals build a picture of the threat. In addition, this compilation 
of intelligence could be useful to the DOS when the secretary is evaluating whether to 
designate an individual or an organization as a terrorist. 
Conversely, investigating the domestic terrorism threat in the United States has a 
more limited list of participants. The Code of Federal Regulations deems the FBI the lead 
agency in a federal terrorism investigation.141 It has 56 field offices and two headquarters 
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divisions—the National Security Branch (NSB) and the Intelligence Branch—to 
coordinate and handle domestic terrorism investigations.142 Within the NSB is the 
Counterterrorism Division, which conducts Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
investigations across the United States. The JTTFs integrate “groups of highly trained, 
locally based . . . investigators [and] analysts” to investigate both international and 
domestic terrorism, and to date, there are approximately 200 JTTFs around the United 
States that include state, local and federal agencies.143  
Another component within NSB is the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which is 
responsible for maintaining the U.S. government’s consolidated counterterrorism 
“watchlisting” component, the Terrorist Screening Database.144 The “watchlist” is a 
compilation of those who have been identified via the DOS’s FTO list, the Treasury’s list 
of specially designated nationals, or front-line law enforcement screening or investigations. 
While the TSC may not apply a technique or equipment in terrorism investigations, as a 
support apparatus, it functions as an interdiction network to actively track and identify 
known or suspected terrorists.  
Even in a limited way, the NCTC is a partner in mitigating domestic terrorism. The 
NCTC’s partnership is limited perhaps because of the founding recommendations in the 9/
11 Commission’s Final Report. The NCTC was established with the mindset of providing 
a “one-stop [shop] to agencies with counterterrorism and homeland security 
responsibilities.”145 Moreover, the NCTC was built on the foundation of the “TTIC 
[Terrorist Threat Integration Center] and supported by the intelligence community as TTIC 
[was then].”146 The premise that the NCTC should emulate TTIC and expand on its reaches 
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into the IC means that the NCTC would be limited, if not restricted from assisting or 
participating in domestic terrorism, because of legal restrictions such as Executive Order 
12333. This executive order—amended in 2004 and 2008—governs intelligence activities 
so as to protect civil liberties by preventing the U.S. government from collecting, 
surveilling, or exploiting U.S. persons’ information. Where the NCTC may be of assistance 
is in an international nexus to a domestic organization. To conclude, while these are 
necessary protections, Executive Order 12333 implicitly restricts the use of available IC 
and DOD intelligence resources to counter domestic terrorism or to supplement domestic 
intelligence collection.  
Depending on the size of the law enforcement organization, there may not be access 
to an intelligence analyst or mechanism to support an agency’s intelligence needs. 
Furthermore, no centralized domestic intelligence apparatus in the U.S. government 
focuses solely on domestic terrorism like the NCTC does on international terrorism. DHS 
has established fusion centers across the United States, but the mission is bigger and more 
diverse than the resources presented.  
B. CASE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
To demonstrate the dichotomy between international and domestic terrorism, this 
section presents two case studies. The first case is the 2015 San Bernardino mass shooting 
that, almost from the beginning, was depicted as an international terrorist attack. The 
second case is the Oklahoma City bombing, considered by terrorism experts as the 
deadliest domestic terrorism attack until 9/11. The case studies highlight some distinctions 
between international and domestic terrorism investigations and prosecutions. 
Following the 2015 IS-inspired terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California, at the 
Inland Regional Center, the two assailants, Syed Rizwan Farook, an American citizen, and 
Tashfeen Malik, his resident alien wife, were not charged with any crimes as they were 
killed during the attack.147 However, a co-conspirator, Enrique Marquez Jr., was charged 
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and convicted of “conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and making false 
statements regarding his involvement in the purchase of guns used by Farook and his wife, 
Tashfeen Malik.”148 Investigators also discovered that Marquez had conspired with Farook 
to plan other attacks.149 In the aftermath of the attack, the FBI had determined that before 
the attack, Tashfeen Malik had pledged allegiance, on behalf of both attackers, to the leader 
of IS on Facebook; the FBI investigated this attack as an act of terrorism.150 A total of 14 
people died and 22 were seriously injured in this terrorist attack.151  
The mastermind of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building, Timothy McVeigh, was an American-born citizen who served in the U.S. 
military and was honorably discharged in December 1991.152 As analyzed by Allison 
Reese, three key factors led to McVeigh’s radicalization: 1) the Weaver family’s Ruby 
Ridge standoff with federal authorities; 2) the standoff between federal authorities and the 
Branch Davidians; and 3) the far-right ideology of The Turner Diaries.153  
These three factors appear to have affected McVeigh—he interpreted them as a call 
to action. The standoffs between private citizens and the U.S. government reinforced the 
beliefs of far-right or anti-government militias that the U.S. government was overreaching 
and limiting the rights of its citizens. As legal experts have stated, “Despite considerable 
evidence linking various militant white supremacists to the tragedy in Oklahoma City . . . 
until September 11, 2001—[the Oklahoma City bombing was] the worst act of terrorism 
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ever on American soil.”154 Nevertheless, no one indicted for the Oklahoma City bombing 
was charged under terrorism statutes; instead, McVeigh and co-conspirator Terry Nichols 
were charged with “conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction to kill persons and 
destroy federal property, for using a truck bomb to kill people, and for the malicious 
destruction of federal property resulting in death.”155 Both were charged with “eight counts 
of violating a federal murder statute against killing federal law enforcement officials—one 
count for each of the eight law enforcement officers killed in the blast.”156 Nichols, was 
“found guilty of conspiracy to bomb a federal building and eight counts of involuntary 
manslaughter,” not conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.157 Some 168 were 
killed and 500 others injured as a result of the Oklahoma City bombing. 
This case study analysis starts with two identical data points—both attacks were 
perpetrated by U.S.-born citizens, and both attacks occurred on U.S. soil—but that is where 
their commonality ends. One aspect of these attacks worth noting is where they fall in the 
U.S. terrorism timeline. Farook executed his terrorist attack more than 14 years after 9/11 
while McVeigh’s terrorist attack occurred six years before 9/11. Oklahoma City would be 
the deadliest attack on U.S. soil until 9/11; conversely, San Bernardino would be described 
as the third-deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11.158 The San Bernardino terrorist attack 
killed 14 individuals and injured 22 others.159 The Oklahoma City bombing killed 168 
individuals and injured 500 others. 
A notable difference between these two attacks is the motivating ideology. Farook 
was inspired by international terrorism in the form of fundamentalist Salafi jihadist 
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doctrine of Sunni Islam and had sworn allegiance to IS before the attack. After the FBI 
discovered Farook’s allegiance to IS, it investigated the shooting as a terrorist attack.160 
On the other hand, McVeigh subscribed to the ideology of white supremacy and right-wing 
terrorism. When he was stopped by the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, he was in possession 
of William F. Pierce’s Turner Diaries, and later during interviews, he described his anger 
and frustration over the U.S. government’s actions in Ruby Ridge and claimed the 
Oklahoma City attack was in retaliation for the U.S. government’s response to the Branch 
Davidian standoff.161 The FBI’s definition of domestic terrorism is as follows: “Violent, 
criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups further [ing] ideological goals 
stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial or 
environmental nature.”162 This definition could have been applied to McVeigh’s actions 
as a domestic terrorist, but it was not.  
Federal authorities have been reticent to apply the condition of material support to 
terrorists unilaterally across the terrorism spectrum. By one account, legal experts have 
noted that the providing-material-support statute is used in almost every international 
terrorism case tried in the United States.163 In contrast, the federal government has applied 
that statute only to one domestic terrorism case since 9/11.164 Although the distinction 
between being designated a terrorist and not may seem trivial, it is crucial in terms of the 
concern over bifurcation of international and domestic terrorism and the application of U.S. 
resources to intelligence development, investigation, and prosecution of these actors.  
This distinction is important because it determines the way in which terrorism 
statutes are applied, and it changes the narrative around these terror-inspired attacks. Again, 
the charges levied against Marquez, Farook’s co-conspirator, included “conspiracy to 
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provide material support to terrorists and making false statements regarding his 
involvement in the purchase of guns used by Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik.”165 
Conversely, McVeigh and his co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, were charged with 
“conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction to kill persons and destroy federal 
property, for using a truck bomb to kill people, and for the malicious destruction of federal 
property resulting in death.”166  
To this day, government officials and the media describe the San Bernardino 
shooting as a terror attack and the Oklahoma City tragedy as a bombing. Bifurcating 
international and domestic terrorism limits the U.S. government’s systematic approach and 
response to an attack.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES OF THE ATOMWAFFEN DIVISION 
AND THE BASE 
To illustrate the emerging trends in REMVEs, this chapter presents case studies of 
two organizations—the AWD and the Base—to describe aspects that are unique to violent 
extremist movements and illustrate the comingling among organizations. The AWD and 
the Base’s relationship has been seen as complimentary—with the AWD an established 
organization and the Base an adaptive, emerging organization. The AWD was established 
in July 2015 and quickly grew in national and international popularity through the Iron 
March digital forum. On the other hand, the Base has a shorter history, given its 
establishment in October 2018. As investigative journalist Ben Makuch describes it, the 
Base is seen as “better organized . . . picking up where Atomwaffen left off in a more 
intelligent way, . . . learning from its [the AWD’s] mistakes and billing itself as this 
decentralized, nation-wide cell network.”167 This is not to say that the Base is replacing 
the AWD, but it is evolving. The Base has taken a lesson-learned perspective, adapting its 
organizational structure and implementing violence more freely and willingly.  
The selection of the AWD and the Base as case studies centered on their symbiotic 
existence. As discussed in Chapter I, both organizations follow the ideologies of 
accelerationism and ethnonationalism, but their connection is like a little brother–big 
brother relationship, to the point that some members of the Base are “double-patching.”168 
The Southern Poverty Law Center defines double-patching as “dual membership in another 
white supremacist group.”169 Moreover, “The Base was designed as an umbrella that could 
draw in people who had been radicalized in other groups, like Atomwaffen Division.”170 
Assessing the AWD’s development over time could show how a burgeoning organization 
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such as the Base might develop. This is a descriptive study of how a white nationalist 
organization begins, evolves, and develops through the lens of established versus emergent 
organizations. The following pages explain the alignment of ideology, organizational 
structure, use of violence, and transnational reach of each group, offering an overview of 
the emerging trend of transnational connections. 
There is a notable divergence between the two groups in that the Base is still 
developing its transnational reach. Even though the Base is still building an international 
network, its Maryland cell comprised two U.S. citizens and a Canadian national. As the 
following pages demonstrate, the AWD is more overtly aligned with international 
organizations than the Base is, but because of the organizations’ close alignment, the Base 
can continue to terrorize the United States and use the AWD’s established international 
connections when beneficial. A case in point is Base member Matthew Ryan Burchfield, 
who admitted to investigative journalists Makuch, Lamoureux, and Kamel that he had 
traveled to Ukraine to gain “war experience and military training.”171  
A predictor or indicator of how the Base will evolve might be evident in how the 
AWD used transnational connections to align itself with the international REMVE scene. 
Additionally, the AWD has leveraged this digital connection not only to reach the masses 
but also to build inroads into Europe and establish affiliates overseas. What does it mean 
to be an affiliate? Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation defines the 
AWD’s affiliates as those “that have sworn fealty to AWD central in the United States, 
publicly adopted the AWD brand, and/or propagated AWD’s ideology.”172 These 
characteristics are important because transnational connections are a turning point that 
allows for an organization to transform from a U.S. domestic terrorist organization into an 
international one. 
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A. ATOMWAFFEN DIVISION 
The AWD was founded by Brandon Clint Russell in 2015 and originally formed 
online through the game-oriented platform Discord, but it gained notoriety on the 
now-defunct fascist online forum Iron March.173 As the movement was gaining traction 
and attention, James Mason, chief ideologue of the AWD, announced online in March 2020 
that it was disbanding due to ongoing pressure from authorities, but only four months later, 
“a group of former AWD leaders announced the reorganization of AWD into the National 
Socialist Order.”174 For the purpose of this thesis, the organization is identified as the 
AWD. 
This section begins by describing the ideological markers and organizational 
structure of the AWD. Then, it details the organization’s alleged criminal activities, 
followed by its emerging transnational connections that led to its international status while 
it still operated domestically in the United States.  
1. Ideology 
The ideology that permeates the AWD is one of a social and political revolution 
that, once again, subjugates non-white, Jewish, female, and LGBTQ communities. While 
the organization identifies itself as “a revolutionary national socialist organization centered 
around political activism and the practice of an autonomous fascist lifestyle,” outsiders 
consider it a neo-Nazi organization with aspirations of starting a race war.175 The AWD is 
a white nationalist, accelerationist organization that idolizes those who have committed 
acts in the name of ethnonationalism, such as Timothy McVeigh, Anders Breivik, and 
Brenton Tarrant.176 McVeigh demonstrated what was possible—Mason advocated in 
Siege that terrorism should be carried out “in a manner commensurate to Timothy 
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McVeigh.”177 While McVeigh stands out, the collective group of McVeigh, Breivik, and 
Tarrant is seen by the AWD as “martyrs to be lionized and worshipped,” due to the attacks 
they committed “in the service of white supremacist ideology.”178  
The AWD’s white nationalistic ideology comes from its chief ideologue, James 
Mason. In the 1980s, Mason created a short-lived newsletter that was subsequently 
compiled in a book titled Siege.179 The AWD saw the significance of Siege, made it 
mandatory reading, and published the book on its site—which also directed its readership 
to “a new website called Siege Culture, a collaboration between AWD members and James 
Mason.”180 Racists, both international and domestic, have embraced Siege as a rallying 
cry for the AWD.181 Siege Culture, made manifest in the AWD–Mason union, embraces 
race wars as a means of destroying society and rebuilding an explicitly white-dominated 
world.182 The Southern Poverty Law Center summarizes Mason’s belief proposition as 
follows: “Only the full collapse of American democracy and society will bring conditions 
sufficient to bring order through Nazism.”183  
Mason found inspiration in such notorious figures as Charles Manson, convicted 
murderer and leader of the Manson family, and William Pierce, American neo-Nazi and 
author of The Turner Diaries, which is required reading for white nationalists.184 By 
accepting Siege Culture as its own, the AWD has transformed a little known but durable 
belief system into a contemporary following.185 As Christopher Adamczyk concludes in 
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his thesis, “Using Siege as its instruction manual, the AWD became the flagship for an 
entire accelerationist movement that quickly spread around the world.”186 The AWD has 
woven together Siege Culture and accelerationism to advance its desired goal of white 
dominance. As examined by the Counter Terrorism Project, the basic tenet of Siege calls 
for a “deliberate terrorist act to bring about a race war and the downfall of the global 
political system.”187 Mason’s focus is on eliminating organized religion, interracial 
marriage, and the perceived world domination by Zionist-occupied governments.188 The 
AWD internalizes accelerationism and accepts “that a race war is . . . desirable, as it is the 
only path to achieving white power by bringing about the downfall of current systems of 
government.”189  
2. Organizational Structure 
The AWD has adopted what Bruce Hoffman calls a “leaderless organization,” 
which closely aligns with the “netwar” concept developed by John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt: 
Protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, 
strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age. These 
protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed organizations, small groups, 
and individuals who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns 
. . . often without precise central command.190 
Hoffman concludes, “This new type of organization is looser, flatter, and more linear.”191 
Viewed as ad hoc terror cells, such organizations “execute attacks independently of one 
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another or any central command, but . . . seek the eventual attainment of a terrorist 
organization or movement’s wider goals.”192 
The AWD’s organization comprises small localized cells that originally started as 
an online community. While members of the organization view Mason and Russell as the 
organizers, the mantra of the AWD maintains it is a leaderless organization. The AWD has 
local-level leaders in geographically distinct locations, such as John Cameron Denton in 
Montgomery, Texas; Michael Lloyd Hubsky in Las Vegas, Nevada; and Kaleb Cole in 
Washington state.193 In addition to the AWD’s ability to amass membership across 
multiple states, it has also formulated an international allegiance overseas in such countries 
as the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, to name a few.194  
3. Violence as a Tool 
Violence is seen as a tool—like a hammer in the hands of a carpenter—so AWD 
members have taken the call to action and committed crimes to further the organization’s 
goals. James Cameron Denton (aka “Rape”), leader of the Texas AWD branch, harassed 
journalists, a Virginia university, and a black church, among others, by placing multiple 
false bomb threats—a form of harassment called “swatting”—to elicit a major response 
from law enforcement.195 In July 2020, Denton pled guilty to conspiracy to commit an 
offense against the United States and interstate threats to injure.196  
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Another indication of impending violence was evident in Michael Lloyd Hubsky’s 
Death Valley Hate Camp—a three-day training camp—for AWD members.197 In 
intercepted online communications, Hubsky describes how “to cut off your enemy’s ability 
to shoot, move and communicate.”198 A review by Thompson, Winston, and Hanrahan of 
these online comments makes mention of Hubsky’s suggestion to blow up infrastructure, 
such as natural gas lines, water lines, and power grids, but only on the West Coast.199 
While none of the attacks have happened, these online discussions could be the seeds that 
lay the groundwork for possible attacks in the future. Moreover, the willingness of AWD 
members to prepare such plans indicates who they really are and what they are interested 
in doing. 
Other members have not only prepared and planned for attacks but also allegedly 
executed violent acts in support of their ideology. Examples include Nicholas Giampa, who 
allegedly murdered his girlfriend’s parents because they forbade her from dating a 
neo-Nazi.200 Samuel Woodward, yet another example, was charged with the murder of 
Blaze Bernstein, an openly gay Jewish college student.201 Furthermore, Beau Merryman 
was indicted for “knowingly distribut [ing] . . . the manufacture and use of an explosive 
and destructive device, namely detailed instructions for constructing pipe bombs” to other 
white nationalists.202 While not an all-inclusive list, this sampling lends support to the 
argument that AWD members are willing to use violence as a tool. 
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4. Transnational Reach—Internationalization 
Since its inception, the AWD has had a transnational reach with its digital 
establishment, which enabled the organization to spread across the world through the 
now-defunct Iron March forum. An example of this established connection between 
American and overseas REMVE organizations is demonstrated by the AWD’s Kaleb Cole 
traveling to Eastern Europe for 25 days in December 2018. While in Kyiv, Ukraine, Cole 
attended a black metal festival hosted by white nationalist organization Azov Battalion.203 
After an extended visit to Europe, an inspection at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago 
by U.S. Customs and Border Protection revealed photos on Cole’s cell phone of him 
visiting Auschwitz concentration camp while holding an AWD flag and wearing masks 
typically associated with the AWD.204  
Terrorism experts have established connections between the AWD and domestic 
terrorist organizations that are both international and geographically disparate. That is to 
say, they are foreign to the United States but linked to U.S. domestic violent extremists 
through ideology and organizational allegiance. Some of these groups are more closely 
affiliated with the AWD while others are more tangentially aligned; nonetheless, both 
categories of organizations believe in the foundation of the AWD—James Mason’s Siege. 
The affiliation of the AWD and the SKD is a close one.205 As the Anti-Defamation League 
has detailed, “Sonnenkrieg rails against a perceived cultural and racial obliteration of the 
white race.”206 However, the organizations differ in where they focus their energy—while 
the AWD is concerned with societal changes in the United States, the SKD is fixated on 
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Europe, particularly the United Kingdom and Eastern Europe.207 On February 25, 2020, 
the United Kingdom designated the SKD a terrorist organization.208  
Another well-known transnational affiliate of the AWD is the FKD, which was 
founded in late 2018 as an “accelerationist neo-Nazi militant organization.”209 Terrorism 
experts speculate the FKD’s origins are in Estonia, but “it has since expanded across 
Europe, with a footprint in Belgium, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Latvia, Germany and Russia.”210 The FKD’s ideology combines accelerationism, 
anti-Semitism, and white nationalism, with a touch of survivalism to prepare its members 
for the collapse and reconstruction of a white ethno-state that would once again dominate 
the world. As of July 2020, the United Kingdom designated the FKD a terrorist 
organization.211 
The case of Conor Climo illustrates the transnational reach of the FKD within the 
continental United States. Climo caught the attention of the FBI after communicating with 
the AWD and FKD via encrypted chats; consequently, the FBI arrested Climo for plotting 
to firebomb Jewish sites in and around Las Vegas.212 In Climo’s criminal complaint, he 
admits joining the FKD “to do something ‘generally different’ related to his hatred of 
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African-Americans, Jews, and Homosexuals.”213 In February 2020, Climo pled guilty to 
possession of an unregistered firearm.214  
B. THE BASE 
The Base was established in July 2018 by Rinaldo Nazzaro, known also by the 
aliases Norman Spear and Roman Wolf on digital platforms.215 Currently, Nazzaro is 
directing a U.S. domestic terrorist organization from a foreign location—Russia.216 The 
name—the Base—is the English translation of al-Qaida (AQ); terrorism experts have noted 
it is unclear whether Nazzaro named the Base intentionally after AQ. However, Makuch 
and Lamoureux have reported that terrorism experts such as Joshua Fisher-Birch have 
surveyed the idea: “It makes sense that extreme white supremacy groups would parrot ISIS 
[Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] or al Qaeda propaganda because both endorse the use of 
extreme violence for ideological ends.”217 An online persona linked to the Base 
recommended that all REMVE organizations read Abu Bakr Naji’s The Management of 
Savagery, a “2004 terrorism manual [that] advocates for a professionalized guerilla 
insurgency steeped in modern propaganda.”218 While the connection is not completely 
clear, it does suggest some synergy among violent extremists. 
This section begins by describing the ideological markers of the Base, its 
organizational structure, and its alleged criminal activities. It concludes with a discussion 
of its emerging transnational connections that led to its international status while it still 
operated domestically in the United States.  
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1. Ideology 
Nazzaro claims the group’s goal is to incite a race war, through accelerationism, as 
a means to “establish a white ethno-state in the United States.”219 Inspired by the founder 
of the Aryan Nations, Richard Butler, who called for white migration to the Northwest in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Nazzaro purchased land in the Pacific Northwest to build a white 
homeland under the name of the Butler Plan.220 Similar to the AWD, the Base requires its 
members to read Siege by James Mason and ascribes to the separation of white people from 
other races; furthermore, Nazzaro has declared his goal is to “unite white nationalists for 
the coming race war that will overthrow the government and reshape society.”221  
2. Organizational Structure 
Nazzaro has described the Base as a paramilitary militant neo-Nazi organization 
looking to recruit people of white European ancestry to “train and build a survivalist and 
self-defense network.”222 The Base claims to be a “leaderless resistance model” with a 
decentralized cellular network comprising small agile cells of only a handful of people.223 
The Southern Poverty Law Center describes the cellular network structure as “regional 
cells [that] share an ideology . . . but have little contact between them—a measure put in 
place to protect the rest of the network.”224 The Base’s structural model is similar to that 
of the AQ, expect that the latter focused on compartmentalizing not decentralizing 
command. 
As mentioned previously, the Base is not limited to a single location but has 
membership among multiple states. While this violent extremist group is primarily active 
 
219 “The Base,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed October 11, 2020, https://www.adl.org/resources/
backgrounders/the-base. 
220 Southern Poverty Law Center, “The Base.” 
221 Ben Makuch and Mack Lamoureux, “Neo-Nazis Are Organizing Secretive Paramilitary Training 
across America,” VICE News, November 20, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en/article/a3mexp/neo-nazis-
are-organizing-secretive-paramilitary-training-across-america. 
222 Anti-Defamation League, “The Base.” 
223 Southern Poverty Law Center, “The Base.” 
224 Southern Poverty Law Center. 
54 
in the United States, it does have some international connections. The Anti-Defamation 
League has listed the Base as active in “Connecticut, Georgia, California, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey New York and Minnesota, as well as international 
locations including Australia, Canada and South Africa.”225 Terrorism experts have 
expanded the list to include Washington, Wisconsin, and Maryland.226  
3. Violence as a Tool 
While Nazzaro has tried to distance himself from the violence, he has “explicitly 
advocate [d] . . . mass violence in their [The Base’s] online communications.”227 Nazzaro 
has continued to advocate a race war following the same model as polarizing groups—he 
has used his First Amendment rights to energize a base and then claimed he never spurred 
anyone to act on his narrative. Some have reported that the Base’s rhetoric has been so 
violent that the group has been removed from far-right social media sites such as Gab.228 
In the two years since its inception, the Base’s members have found comradery and acted 
on their ideology in violent ways. The aforementioned ideological leanings and use of 
violence confirms the Base is operating similarly to others in the REMVE movement and 
is not an outlier.  
Violent rhetoric has incited members to plan and initiate hate-based attacks. As 
previously noted, the FBI arrested the three members of a Maryland cell—Brian Lemley, 
Patrik Mathews, and William Bilbroughs. They were arrested before they could act on their 
violent plan to attack a gun rally scheduled to take place in Richmond, Virginia, in January 
2020.229 In court documents, the FBI detailed the group members’ continuous ruminations 
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on “committing targeted acts of violence.”230 Concerned about this group’s intent and 
ability, the FBI continued to investigate and document its activity. The FBI noted the 
Maryland cell’s discussions about its plans approximately two weeks before the gun rally. 
In an FBI recording, Mathews asks, “Are we loading the truck, when we go to Virginia as 
if potential like operations?” to which Lemley replies, “We’re loading the truck for the war 
. . . essentially.”231 An investigative reporter who infiltrated the Maryland cell of the Base 
exposed its penchant for violence in encrypted messaging.232 Mathews wrote, “We’re real 
(expletive) Nazis and they can’t do s--- to us but wait for us to put em . . . against the wall. 
. . . We’re starting with action.”233 The cell was charged with transporting a firearm and 
ammunition with intent to commit a felony; transporting and harboring Patrik Mathews, an 
illegal alien who entered the United States without inspection; and conspiracy—not to 
mention Patrik Mathews’s indictment as an alien in possession of a firearm and 
ammunition.234 
Additionally, in January 2020, three more members of the Base were arrested in 
Georgia on criminal charges of plotting to commit murder and overthrow the U.S. 
government; the group had planned to murder a couple who were local Antifa leaders 
sympathetic with the far-left Antifa movement.235 In August 2020, Yousef O. Barasneh, a 
member of the Great Lakes cell pled guilty to “conspiring to violate citizens’ rights to U.S. 
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property free from threats and intimidation.”236 Through online chats, he had committed 
“to threaten and intimidate African Americans and Jewish Americans, who [he] viewed as 
enemies of the white race.”237 In September 2019, Barasneh honored his commitments by 
going to the Beth Israel Sinai synagogue and vandalizing it with anti-Semitic words and 
Nazi symbols.238 
While the Base does not claim an act of violence, the previously discussed 
examples demonstrate its members are willing and preparing to act. While there is recent 
history of law enforcement interceding before the violent act occurs, it will not always be 
the case.  
4. Transnational Reach—Internationalization 
Similar to the AWD, the Base has developed its own connections to transnational 
organizations.239 The Base is younger than the AWD, having started only in mid-2018, but 
it has developed a network in the United States and overseas including citizens from 
Canada, Europe, South Africa, and Australia.240  
Based on similar organizational frameworks, the affiliation between the Base and 
Australian nationalist socialist organizations, such as the Antipodean Resistance, is 
consistent with their ideological position on accelerationism and the creation of an 
ethno-state. As the Program on Extremism assesses in its February 2020 analysis, members 
of the Antipodean Resistance “see themselves as being in an existential struggle to save 
the white race, as well as a quest to foster revolutionary change in the near future.”241 The 
Southern Poverty Law Center succinctly discusses the connections between the Base and 
like-minded Australians that appear to emerge in 2019 with the interest of a handful of 
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men.242 To capitalize on the interest, Nazzaro named one Base applicant, “Volkskrieger,” 
the Australian recruiter.243 Through encrypted conversations on the app Wire, 
Volkskrieger describes his connections and recruitment opportunities within nationalist, 
socialist, accelerationist groups: FacistForge, Lads Society, the United Patriots Front, and 
the Antipodean Resistance.244 While these organizations are locally focused and 
independent, they are also connected—once they are connected, digitally or physically, 
they become a movement with transnational reach.  
In a recent journal article, terrorism scholars Seth Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and 
Nicholas Harrington assert the DME will remain a constant in the violent extremist milieu, 
as it is a vital medium for domestic terrorists to collaborate, radicalize, and coordinate 
around the world.245 This movement is geographically nationless and does not seek a 
permanent home, but it thrives in the dialogue of extremist ideology posted on 
imageboards, chans, and blogs.  
Groups such as the AWD and the Base are part of a transnational movement that 
intertwines REMVE ideology with the perceived extinction of the entire “white race.”246 
They not only look to their international connections for inspiration but also franchise their 
organizations overseas, or vice versa. Think tanks, such as the Soufan Center, and 
academics have noted there are known AWD affiliates overseas in the United Kingdom 
and Germany.247 If examined from another angle, as Bruce Hoffman argues in his book 
 
242 Jackson, 36. 
243 Southern Poverty Law Center, “The Base.” 
244 Southern Poverty Law Center. 
245 Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington, The Right-Wing Terrorism Threat in Europe. 
246 Devlin Barrett, “Arrests in Domestic Terror Probes Outpace Those Inspired by Islamic 
Extremists,” Washington Post, March 9, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
arrests-in-domestic-terror-probes-outpace-those-inspired-by-islamic-extremists/2019/03/08/0bf329b6-392f-
11e9-a2cd-307b06d0257b_story.html. At the initial drafting of this thesis, the group’s name was the 
Atomwaffen Division. As of August 12, 2020, it officially modified its name to the National Socialist 
Order. “IntelBrief: Atomwaffen Goes Global,” Soufan Center, August 12, 2020, 
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-atomwaffen-goes-global/. 
247 Soufan Center, The Atomwaffen Division: The Evolution of the White Supremacy Threat (New 
York: Soufan Center, 2020), 15–18, https://thesoufancenter.org/research/the-atomwaffen-division-the-
evolution-of-the-white-supremacy-threat/. 
58 
Inside Terrorism, ad hoc terror cells “execute attacks independently of one another or any 
central command, but . . . seek the eventual attainment of a terrorist organization or 
movement’s wider goals.”248 What may at first appear to be networks could be developing 
into a movement.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Comprehending the objectives of violent extremist organizations such as the AWD 
and the Base helps the U.S. government recognize the methods these groups are willing to 
use to accomplish their goals; furthermore, the composition of these organizations makes 
manifest the means they are willing to employ to effect change. These organizations are 
predominately male, of varying age, and with varying military experience. This new cohort 
of violent extremists is willing to use the military experience of its members to train other 
members in military tactics and weapons, and the use of explosives and asymmetric 
warfare.249 An example of this capability is the AWD’s hosting of “hate camp hiking 
excursions,” used to indoctrinate and provide members with survival skills that could be 
useful if society collapses and is under reconstruction.250 In another case, as detailed by 
investigative journalist Ben Makuch, the Base’s Nazzaro advises “it’s illegal if you’re 
training in order to cause civil unrest. . . . If you’re training for survivalism and self defense 
you’re good to go.”251 The acknowledgment of both legal and illegal activities coupled 
with the methods demonstrates the seriousness of the members’ willingness to participate 
in race wars and political insurrection.252 Understanding the AWD and the Base will shed 
light on an undercurrent that is flourishing in contemporary society.  
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This thesis began by asking what challenges homegrown REMVE actors or 
organizations pose to HSE. The first challenge identified is related to the constitutional 
protections provided to REMVE actors and organizations because of their legal status in 
the United States. Because of their legal status, their rights to speech and peaceful assembly 
are protected by the First Amendment, which in turn makes them untouchable. The second 
identified challenge is how the U.S. federal government categorizes homegrown REMVE 
actors or organizations. Some REMVE actors or organizations have meaningful 
connections with international terrorists. Furthermore, because of these connections, the 
HSE must cease automatically classifying homegrown REMVE actors or organizations as 
domestic terrorists but classify those with meaningful transnational connections as 
international terrorists.  
What is apparent from the recent increase in violence, as shown in Chapter II and 
described in Chapter IV, is that REMVE actors are not just embracing their freedom of 
speech but engaging in violence. Unite the Right and the January 6 insurrection are 
well-known incidents, but since 2016, lesser-known, smaller acts of violence committed 
by REMVE actors have increased. When REMVE actors transform words into violent 
action, they lose their status as untouchable under the First Amendment but then fall under 
the Fourth Amendment protections of search and seizure. Mitigating the threat of 
homegrown violent extremists has never been about silencing speech; however, it has been 
about limiting the damage these groups do to the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness of 
those they focus their violence on.  
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable” search and seizure, but it 
also affords authorities the ability to surveil anyone, foreign or domestic, who “acts for or 
on behalf of a foreign power . . . contrary to the interests of the United States”—this type 
of investigative authority is granted by FISA.253 Considering that REMVE actors or 
organizations are no longer purely domestic but transnational, this latitude allows the U.S. 
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government to investigate them to the fullest extent of the law and under the purview of 
probable cause while protecting the core rights that the Fourth Amendment covers.  
If the U.S. government begins to categorize the AWD or the Base not as First 
Amendment purveyors but as violators of law, the Fourth Amendment’s requirements 
would become an available tool for mitigating REMVE violence. This would enable law 
enforcement authorities to use probable cause to use tools such as FISA to develop 
evidence of the culpability of REMVE actors in violent criminal attacks. 
It is not without reason to suggest the application of the Fourth Amendment’s FISA 
option to U.S. citizens would be unnerving to some. The United States’ recent history of 
balancing security with protecting civil liberties has been a challenge for a system that 
places greater value on national security than on privacy rights. Even with robust 
monitoring, the American public remembers the FBI’s counterintelligence programs and 
civil rights violations of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. Indeed, Director Hoover’s programs to 
collect and surveil on U.S. citizens were not always within the bounds of the law.254 The 
Church and Pike Committees exposed “previous abuses of U.S. persons’ privacy rights by 
certain components of the U.S. government . . . to counter purported threats to national 
security.”255 The Church and Pike Committees revealed that when there is limited to no 
oversight, the predilection of men in power is to subjectively, and without external rigorous 
debate, determine who or what organizations threaten the state.  
The populace would need to trust the opaque framework of FISA and warrantless 
searches and believe U.S. authorities are minimizing the collection, retention, and 
dissemination of incidentally collected identities of U.S. citizens while collecting on those 
working with foreign powers.256 Along the same line, some in law enforcement may have 
reservations about surveilling their fellow U.S. citizens and interpret this type of 
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intelligence collection as an infringement on a person’s privacy rights. When the concept 
of surveilling U.S. citizens makes people uncomfortable, it should be countered with the 
following question: If the U.S. government could stop another Oklahoma City bombing or 
an El Paso Wal-Mart shooting, should it, or should the terrorist’s civil liberties and privacy 
outweigh a victim’s life? Such a quandary leaves lingering questions of how the U.S. 
government can install the appropriate safeguards into a system that must balance civil 
liberties with national security. This thesis does not purport to answer the larger question 
of how to enforce transparency in a system that is purposefully blind.  
If the U.S. government starts categorizing REMVE actors or organizations with 
meaningful transnational connections as international terrorists, there is another tool it can 
employ to mitigate the threat of terrorism—the FTO list. The FTO list is used to identify 
and sanction terrorists as well as criminalize the act of providing material support to anyone 
or any organization on the FTO list. The organizations to which the U.S. REMVE actors 
or organizations are meaningfully connected are likely designated in their own respective 
homelands; minimally, U.S. REMVE actors or organizations are providing support to 
known international terrorists. 
Expanding on this concept, consider the influence of a foreign country’s terrorist 
designation and/or sanctions as grounds for designating U.S. REMVE actors or 
organizations as FTOs. For example, the United States relied on a foreign country’s 
terrorist designation to indict members of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) on January 14, 2021. 
The DOJ indicted members of MS-13, a Central American–based international criminal 
gang, under “conspiracy to provide and conceal material support to terrorists, conspiracy 
to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, [and] conspiracy to finance 
terrorism” based on the recent whole-of-government approach to mitigating its threat.257 
While not the whole justification, the United States was able to leverage the El Salvadoran 
Supreme Court’s 2015 terrorist designation of MS-13.258 
 
257 “MS-13’s Highest-Ranking Leaders Charged with Terrorism Offenses in the United States,” 
Department of Justice, January 14, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ms-13-s-highest-ranking-leaders-
charged-terrorism-offenses-united-states. 
258 Steven Dudley, “6 Reasons Why the U.S. Charged MS13 Leaders with Terrorism,” InSight Crime, 
January 15, 2021, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/ms13-leaders-terrorism/. 
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As illustrated in Chapter III, the AWD and the Base have well-established 
transnational links to designated organizations that should be sufficient to designate both 
organizations FTOs. An example of a foreign government’s proactive mitigation of 
transnationally linked violent extremists is the recent action taken by Canada’s government 
listing—comparable to the U.S. designation of international terrorists—of “ideologically 
motivated violent extremist groups: Atomwaffen Division, the Base, the Proud Boys and 
Russian Imperial Movement” in early February 2021.259 
If U.S. REMVE actors or organizations are designated on the FTO list, sanctioning 
an organization can affect its ability to recruit and criminalize participation in its financial 
transactions or business functions, given its status as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, 
adding the charge of “material support or resources” can add between 15 and 20 years of 
imprisonment to a conviction. Finally, designating U.S. REMVEs as international terrorists 
would send the message to U.S. partners and allies that this new transnational REMVE 
movement poses a significant threat to global peace. 
  
 
259 Public Safety Canada, “Canada Lists 13 New Groups as Terrorist Entities.” 
63 
APPENDIX A. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF 
PROVOCATIVE SPEECH 
Supreme Court decisions on freedom of expression have varied depending on the 
circumstances. In two World War I cases, the court upheld decisions that deferred to the 
U.S. government. In Schenck v. United States, the court heard the case of Charles Schenck 
and Elizabeth Baer, who were charged with violating the Espionage Act of 1917 when they 
distributed leaflets that equated the military draft to involuntary servitude and claimed it 
violated the 13th Amendment.260 In a unanimous decision, the court held that the 
Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment. Moreover, it found, “When a nation 
is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort 
that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard 
them as protected by any constitutional right.”261 In Justice Holmes’ opinion, Schenck and 
Baer’s actions violated the clear and present danger test, as “the words used [could have 
brought] about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”262  
In Abrams v. United States, when the United States had been at war with Germany 
on Russian soil, the court heard the case of two Russian immigrant defendants who had 
circulated literature undermining ammunition production. The defendants had been 
convicted for throwing two leaflets from a window denouncing American troops in Russia 
and munition production.263 The court held “the leaflets violated the Espionage Act. 
Congress’ determination that all such propaganda posed a danger to the war effort was 
sufficient to meet the standard set in Schenck v. United States for prosecuting attempted 
crimes. As in Schenck, the Court emphasized that protections on speech are lower during 
wartime.”264  
 
260 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
261 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
262 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
263 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
264 “Abrams v. United States,” Oyez, accessed March 23, 2021, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-
1940/250us616. 
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In contrast, the court has upheld the freedom of expression in such cases as Cohen 
v. California.265 The case entailed a 19-year-old store worker’s being charged with 
maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace by protesting the Vietnam War by wearing 
a jacket that read, “Fuck the draft. Stop the war.”266 The court decided that while the words 
were provocative, there was no evidence people were provoked by the words on the man’s 
jacket: 
We cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular 
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the 
process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of 
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of 
unpopular views.267 
With this decision, the court protected both the expression of ideas and the expression of 
emotion.268  
The Supreme Court also upheld free speech in Brandenburg v. Ohio.269 The issue 
in question was whether Ku Klux Klan leader Clarence Brandenburg’s First Amendment 
rights were violated when he was convicted under the Ohio criminal syndicalism law, 
which made it illegal to advocate “crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of 
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.”270 The court decided 
that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg’s First Amendment rights.  
The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can 
be prohibited if it is “directing at inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action” and (2) it is “likely to incite or produce such action.” The criminal 
syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while 
ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite 
 
265 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
266 “Cohen v. California,” Oyez, accessed March 23, 2021, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/299. 
267 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
268 Oyez, “Cohen v. California.” 
269 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
270 ORC Ann. 2923.13, quoted in Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445. 
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imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the 
law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.271  
The court decided on behalf of Brandenburg because the criminal syndicalism law did not 
consider the words vis-à-vis the actual imminent incitement caused by those words. 
  
 
271 “Brandenburg v. Ohio,” Oyez, accessed March 23, 2021, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/492. 
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APPENDIX B. EXTENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
OF EXPRESSIVE ACTION 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District involved students’ 
decision to wear armbands in support of a truce in the Vietnam War.272 They were 
suspended from school for wearing the armbands, and the question brought before the court 
was whether the school had violated the students’ First Amendment right to free speech 
when it prohibited their symbolic protest.273 The court ruled,  
In order for the State . . . to justify prohibition of a particular expression of 
opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something 
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no 
finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 
“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school,” the prohibition cannot be 
sustained.274  
The school was unable to prove that the armbands materially and substantially interfered 
with its operations.  
Another case in which the court upheld First Amendment rights was Virginia v. 
Black, which decided that “while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban 
cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, the provision in the Virginia statute 
treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute 
unconstitutional in its current form.”275 In essence, cross burning could be a form of 
expressive action and is not proof of intent to intimidate. 
  
 
272 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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